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I. INTRODUCTION
The emerging law of sexual harassment has focused discussion
on the political, sociological, and legal issues surrounding sexual
conduct. Some commentators have argued that the developing law
insufficiently addresses an underlying political imbalance between
men and women. Although these commentators eschew sexual har-
assment law as a plausible means of achieving an egalitarian, sex-
427
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blind society, they offer few concrete suggestions for reaching their
goal. A few scholars have taken a position at the other extreme, that
sexual harassment is more or less a chimera, and that the injury
women claim to experience is simply part of the vicissitudes of life, or,
in the case of workplace harassment, of their employment bargain.
Sexual harassment, however defined, is an unusual social prob-
lem in that one group of people engage in the challenged conduct and
another group bears the loss, with virtually no overlap. The groups
are easily identified as men and women. Commentators have ex-
plained the phenomenon as evidence of the subordination of women by
men.' The insular quality of the groups and the political imbalance
between them has prompted some commentators to draw the conclu-
sion that sexual harassment should be addressed as part of global
social policy, not as an issue of allocation of loss among individuals.2
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. J.D. 1984, University of
Illinois; B.A. 1981, University of Illinois. The Author wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the
comments of Donald Boudreaux and John Lopatka, and to extend special thanks to Jane Aiken,
who has reaffirmed the Author's belief that difference need not divide.
1. See, for example, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 1
(Yale U., 1979); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 217, 219, 227
(Harvard U., 1989); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 Yale L. J. 1177, 1194 (1990); Andrea Dworkin,
Against the Male Flood. Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 Harv. Women's L. J. 1, 21
(1985). Some commentators have described sexual harassment as a tool men use to reinforce
male domination in the workplace and to relegate women to traditional "female" and inferior
work. See, for example, Suzanne C. Carothers and Peggy Crull, Contrasting Sexual Harassment
in Female-and Male-Dominated Occupations, in Karen Brodkin Sacks and Dorothy Remy, eds.,
My Troubles Are Going to Have Trouble with Me: Everyday Trials and Triumphs of Women
Workers 219 (Rutgers U., 1984); Peggy Crull, Sexual Harassment and Male Control of Women's
Work (Working Women's Inst. Res. Ser. Rep. No. 5, 1982). On the subordination of women, see
generally Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary
America (U.N.C., 1980); Ellen Carol Dubois, Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an
Independent Women's Movement in America, 1848-1869 (Cornell U., 1978); Alice Kessler-Harris,
Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States (Oxford U., 1982); Angela Y.
Davis, Women, Race and Class (Random House, 1981).
2. See MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment at 172 (cited in note 1). See also Wendy Pollack,
Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 Harv. Women's L. J. 35, 40
(1990) (noting that sexual harassment is a "social, systemic problem], and not the isolated
problem of a lone victim"). One commentator has observed that antidiscrimination law "obscures
for women the actual causes of their oppression and treats discrimination against women as an
irrational and capricious departure from the normal objective operation of the market, instead of
recognizing such discrimination as a pervasive aspect of our dichotomized system." Frances
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497,
1552 (1983). See also Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the
Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
79, 149-54 (1989) (examining the failure of discrimination analysis to deal with issues of power
and gender).
The perspective that appears common to feminist criticism of individual loss allocation is that
sexual harassment causes global but not individual loss, or at least that individual loss is theoreti-
cally eclipsed by the global loss. See, for example, MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment at 172. See
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For example, Catharine MacKinnon advocates sexual harassment
policy that would "change the society so that this kind of injury need
not and does not recur."3 Luxuriously, MacKinnon and her followers
ignore entirely the social cost of such a societal restructuring.4
Determining what conduct constitutes sexual harassment
would seem central to any attempt to formulate a sensible policy, yet
the definition of the concept continues to spark passionate debate
among scholars, on factory floors, and around photocopy machines.
Some academic commentators define sexual harassment broadly as
"the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power."r This definition might suffice for a
political science final examination, but it does little to guide the
adjudication of conduct and the allocation of loss in the real world.
Feminist commentators take great pride in having named sexual
harassment. 7  But simply naming the harm does not provide a
practical means of delineating harmful sexual behavior from valuable,
productive conduct.8
also note 23 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding the strong political usefulness of this view,
it is not the only possible perspective.
3. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment at 172 (cited in note 1).
4. Richard Posner has noted in response to critics of the positive theory of economic
analysis of law: "A theory, unless quite hopeless, is overturned not by pointing out its defects or
limitations but by proposing a more inclusive, more powerful, above all more useful theory."
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 26 (Little, Brown, 4th ed. 1992) (emphasis in
original). Criticisms of the emerging law of sexual harassment that offer no alternative theory or
no more useful perspective than that which criticizes the status quo are similarly ineffectual.
5. Macinnon, Sexual Harassment at 1 (cited in note 1). In the same breath, MacKinnon
recognizes that her definition of sexual harassment places sexual conduct on "a continuum of se-
verity and unwantedness... depending upon the employment circumstances." Id. at 2. See also
Lin Farley, Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women on the Job 14-15 (McGraw-
Hill, 1978) (defining sexual harassment as "unsolicited nonreciprocal male behavior that asserts a
woman's sex role over her function as worker"); Pollack, 13 Harv. Women's L. J. at 53 (cited in
note 2) (defining sexual harassment as "any conduct that is linked to male dominance and
requires female subordination").
6. The term "feminist" is susceptible to so many meanings that it has virtually none.
Laura Stein recently defined the term to mean "all persons engaged in the struggle against the
social oppression of women." Laura Stein, Living with the Risk of Backfire A Response to the
Feminist Critiques of Privacy and Equality, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 1153 & n.1 (1993). See note 16.
7. See MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment at 27-28 (cited in note 1); Pollack, 13 Harv.
Women's L. J. at 41 n.16 (cited in note 2) (arguing that "[t]he power of naming one's own self and
one's own reality, to understand that one contributes to the creation of one's own culture, is taken
away from those who are oppressed and it must be reclaimed").
8. For example, Naomi Cahn proposes a standard of reasonable sexual conduct that would
'be contextual, focusing on the victim's actual reactions." Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal
Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and Practice, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1398,
1435 (1992). Cahn recognizes that her proposed standard results in a "broad indeterminacy of le-
gally appropriate behavior." Id. at 1436.
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In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,9 the Supreme Court held
that actionable sexual conduct under Title VII is that which a reason-
able person would find hostile or abusive. 1° The Court's opinion leaves
lower courts virtually without guidance as they embark on the task of
identifying how reasonable people feel." It leaves individuals in the
dark about what workplace conduct is "reasonable" and what is not.
The dialectical impasse on the subject of sexual harassment
arises from the absence in the emerging law and contemporary schol-
arship of a principled, practical paradigm under which to allocate the
loss associated with the same sexual conduct. Casting sexual har-
assment as a sui generis problem born of an intractable perception gap
between men and women turns sexual harassment into a political
anthem.12 Apart from the rhetoric, however, the loss caused by sexual
harassment is similar to other loss routinely addressed by laws-it
occurs, its causes can be identified, although imperfectly, and it can be
prevented. Ignoring the capacity of sexual harassment policy to allo-
cate loss wastes its potential to maximize wealth and to achieve an
economically optimal distribution of loss.
Fortunately for those who know there is "no free lunch,"' 3 the
law has developed a means of arriving at an optimal level of loss un-
der conditions of scarcity. This Article proposes a paradigm that
draws from the common-law rule of negligence. It defines actionable
sexual conduct in the workplace in terms of the cost of precautionary
conduct and the increased safety such precaution would have yielded.
Like the rule of negligence, the proposed paradigm creates incentives
for men and women to take steps to prevent sexual conduct loss to the
point at which the cost of an additional increment of precaution is
equal to the value of the reduction in risk of loss.14 This point is the
9. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
10. Id. at 370. Additionally, the plaintiff must subjectively perceive the conduct as abusive.
Id. The Court recognized that its decision did not yield a "mathematically precise test." Id. at 371.
Harris held that whether a working environment is "hostile" or "abusive" "can be determined only
by looking at all the circumstances." Id.
11. See id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
12. Perhaps fanning the flames of controversy, rather than contributing to the process of
resolving it, is the true goal of some scholars on the subject. See Stein, 77 Minn. L. Rev. at 1186
(cited in note 6). Stein recognizes that feminist arguments based on concepts of equality have a
.moral high ground" that arguments expressly directed at advancing the interests of women as a
discrete group lack. She observes: "Losing this high ground is a practical danger; it is question-
able whether women have the political muscle to flourish if we become just another interest
group." Id. She gives as an example of the ineffectiveness of "women" as a political group the re-
cent passage of state statutes that restrict women's access to abortions. Id. at 1186-87 n.138.
13. Milton Friedman, There's No Such Thing as a Free Lunch (Open Court. 1974).
14. The premise that common-law rules like the negligence principle can be understood as a
means of allocating loss efficiently underlies the positive theory of the economic analysis of law.
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optimal level of precaution. After this point, additional precaution
might further reduce sexual conduct loss, but the cost of such
precaution would outweigh the resulting benefit.
Admittedly, focusing on the costs of preventing loss from sexual
conduct to inform the allocation of such loss does not create a politi-
cally "neutral" basis for evaluating sexual conduct. No paradigm,
however conceived or applied, can obscure its purpose-determining
what conduct is and is not "reasonable" under given circumstances. 5
Some commentators propose a standard for workplace sexual conduct
reflecting their individual tastes, or those of an inspecific group of
women. Any standard of conduct, including those proposed in the best
interest of women, imposes a cost that, although seldom directly
addressed by the proponent, is very real.
The proposed paradigm provides a framework against which to
measure the social cost of competing standards of workplace sexual
conduct. It presents a method to identify "reasonable" conduct, defin-
ing it as taking precaution up to the point that the average cost
(averaged over all potential actors) of additional precaution would not
be offset by a reduction in expected cost (averaged over all potential
reactors). A proposed standard that requires care beyond "reasonable
care," so defined, wastes social resources because on average, the
additional precaution does not yield a sufficient improvement in work-
place conditions to be worth its price. Defined this way, "reasonable
care" is a dynamic concept adaptable to specific circumstances in a
given case, as well as to changes over time in attitudes about what
level of cost and benefit is "average."
Practical application of the paradigm to workplace sexual
conduct reveals more the absence of a social consensus than the exis-
tence of one. Individual tastes regarding sexual conduct vary widely
and conclusions about what a "reasonable person" or even a
"reasonable woman" would find offensive or harmless in a given situ-
ation are precarious. Even so, for some sexual conduct, like that
which constitutes "quid pro quo harassment," consensus is relatively
strong. In contrast, for some, but not all, so-called "hostile work
environment harassment," there currently may be no consensus. In
the absence of a social consensus regarding the costs and benefits of
See generally Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (cited in note 4); Robert Cooter and Thomas
Ulen, Law and Economics (Scott, Foresman, 1988).
15. See generally Ehrenreich, 99 Yale L. J. 1177 (cited in note 1). The search for neutrality
is futile as long as there are diverse preferences for sexual conduct. See generally Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
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challenged conduct, there is no assurance that reallocating loss will
yield an efficiency gain sufficient to offset the considerable administra-
tive costs of adjudicating the dispute. In such cases, the optimal loss
allocation rule is not to intervene at all.
Part II of the Article proposes an adaptation of the rule of
negligence as a paradigm for allocating the loss sexual conduct can
cause. Part III applies the paradigm to the problem of loss from sex-
ual conduct, with particular focus on sexual conduct in the workplace.
Part IV responds to some of the criticisms of the emerging law of
sexual harassment.
II. A PARADIGM FOR SEXUAL CONDUCT Loss
A. A New Vocabulary for Sexual Harassment
The vocabulary courts and commentators have developed to
address the problem of sexual harassment is inadequate to evaluate
competing sexual harassment policies. The current lexicon is missing
words for key concepts. Their absence appears to be more than just
semantic. Perhaps writers on the subject of sexual harassment delib-
erately have failed to develop the words because recognition of such
concepts would undermine their conclusions. At the least, the gaps
reveal a lack of scholarly rigor.
The term "sexual harassment" itself has no static meaning. 6
Both the word "sexua' and the word "harassment" invoke a meaning
16. See Jane Byeff Korn, The Fungible Woman and Other Myths of Sexual Harassment, 67
Tulane L. Rev. 1363, 1371 (1993). Interestingly, the term "feminism" also appears to lack
objective meaning. Feminists readily acknowledge that there is no one correct feminist position.
See, for example, Morrison Torrey, Jackie Casey, and Karin Olson, Teaching Law in a Feminist
Manner: A Commentary from Experience, 13 Harv. Women's L. J. 93, 109-10 n.51 (1990).
Eschewing any single positive theory, feminists effectively have immunized themselves from
logical refutation. The term "feminism," although it does not describe a theoretical position, does
connote an inviolate supposition about human interaction, namely, oppression by men of women.
See, for example, Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary Feminist Thought xix (G. K. Hall, 1983)
(stating that "[fleminism is an egalitarian impulse, seeking to free women from oppression by re-
moving all of the obstacles to their political, economic, and sexual self-determination"). Feminism
takes oppression in all aspects of existence as a given and adopts activist rather than academic
means to eradicate it. See, for example, Patricia A. Cain, Teaching Feminist Legal Theory, 38 J.
Legal Ed. 165, 172 (1988); Clive Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Structure of
Feminist Legal Thought, 3-4 Berkeley Women's L. J. 1, 2-3 (1988); Martha L. Fineman,
Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 Fla. L.
Rev. 25 (1990).
432 [Vol. 47:427
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that varies widely depending on the person considering the words. 17
Thus, it is impossible to evaluate the current proposals dealing with
"sexual harassment" on the basis of their relative effects on the con-
duct. If the goal of policy is to eliminate sexual harassment, then
obviously it is necessary to identify the conduct to be eliminated. We
cannot tell if the policy reduces "sexual harassment" if we do not know
ex ante what "sexual harassment" is.
Skipping the hard definitional problem immunizes feminist
criticism of existing policy from refutation. Instead of honestly search-
ing for a way to identify "sexual harassment" among the universe of
interpersonal conduct, some commentators use the term to refer
generally and without elaboration to conduct they consider negative. 18
Thus, any loss allocation scheme that yields a result of which they
disapprove is, virtually by fiat, flawed. 9
17. For some feminist writers, the sexual aspect of the challenged conduct distinguishes it
from any other type of conduct and justifies special treatment for the loss it causes. See note 5.
Whether conduct is sexual would seem a critical threshold determination, yet feminist scholars
have yet to define "sexual" conduct or distinguish it from the universe of "nonsexual" conduct.
Some writers implicitly define virtually all human interaction as sexual. See, for example,
Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (supporting the view that all human interaction is
sexual). Others define conduct as sexual if it is undertaken by a male and "requires female
subordination." Pollack, 13 Harv. Women's L. J. at 53 (cited in note 2). Yet other commentators
contend that conduct is sexual whenever it is directed at a person "because of her gender," even if
it is not explicitly sexual in the biological sense. See, for example, Barbara Zalucki, Comment,
Defining the Hostile Work Environment Claim of Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 11 W. New
Eng. L. Rev. 143, 171-75 (1989). The EEOC Guidelines state that "sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" can constitute sexual
harassment under certain circumstances, see note 79 and accompanying text, but they do not
provide guidance on when conduct is "of a sexual nature." Several courts appear to have
embraced a broad definition of "conduct of a sexual nature." For example, in Bell v. Crackin Good
Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497 (1 th Cir. 1985), the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor insulted her
by calling her the "pimp for the office" and talking to her "like [she] was about two years old and
two inches high." Id. at 1499. The Eleventh Circuit held that the alleged conduct, although not
explicitly sexual, was within the scope of Title VII because it affected the conditions of the
plaintiffs employment and was directed at her because she was a woman. Id. at 1501-03. See
also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990); Hall v. Gus Construction
Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir.
1987); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
18. As used by some commentators, the term "sexual harassment" incorporates a distribu-
tive judgment as to who should bear the cost of such conduct, just as labelling driving on the
sidewalk as negligent reveals a judgment that the driver should compensate an injured pedes-
trian. Wendy Pollack's discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson illustrates the theoretical abyss created by the use of "sexual harassment" as both a de-
scriptive term and a distributional conclusion. She asks rhetorically: "If only 'unreasonable
interference' is actionable, does this mean there is reasonable interference? Isn't it unreasonable
to ask the victim of sexual harassment to tolerate any interference with her ability to perform her
job?" Pollack, 13 Harv. Women's L. J. at 48 (cited in note 2) (emphasis in original).
19. See generally Pollack, 13 Harv. Women's L. J. 35 (cited in note 2); Christine Merriman
and Cora Yang, Employer Liability for Co- Worker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 83 (1984-85). Commentators frequently identify the flaw as the patriarchal
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Feminists have coined the term "sexual harassment" to refer to
sexual conduct they find offensive. As of yet, however, no one has
coined a companion term for non-offensive sexual conduct.20  To fill
this gap in the lexicon, this Article proposes the terms "negative" and
"positive" sexual conduct to characterize sexual conduct by reference
to the tastes of a particular person. Characterizing sexual conduct
based on the tastes and preferences of an individual who experiences
that conduct presupposes that an individual's reaction to conduct
(positive or negative) accurately reflects the value or cost of that
conduct to her.21 She is presumptively the best judge of whether and
to what extent the challenged conduct harmed or benefitted her.22
Thus, one worker may consider pictures of unclothed women posted in
unavoidable areas in the workplace negative sexual conduct but her
co-worker may consider the display of the same pictures positive
sexual conduct.
The idea that the existence and boundaries of loss or benefit lie
within the province of the individual constitutes one of the corner-
stones of economic theory. Feminist theory, on the other hand, up-
ends the primacy of the individual with concepts that identify harm or
benefit to individuals based on the perceptions of a group of observers,
usually feminists.23 For purposes of this Article, however, harm is
attitudes of judges, who, they observe, are predominantly male, and presumptively not fit to judge
sexual conduct. See, for example, Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1203 (1989) (claiming that "[b]ecause
most judges are men, who have experienced the traditional forms of male socialization, their
instinctive reaction is to accept the perspective of the employer"); Kenneth Karst, The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term-Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 54 n.304 (1977); Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, U. Ill. L. Rev. 413, 420 (1991). See
also Kenneth Karst, Judging and Belonging, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1957, 1959 (1988) (explaining that
"[wiomen know that, in general, men tend to be blind to the realities of women's lives"). But see
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Ward, J.)
(involving opinions decided by male judges who were able to overcome their "instinct").
20. To suggest that some women consider some sexual conduct beneficial will no doubt be
controversial with radical feminists. See Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse (Free Press, 1987)
(claiming that sexual intercourse is by nature coercive and perpetuates the subordination of
women). Nonetheless, overwhelming anecdotal evidence supports the proposition.
21. Individuals who consider sexual conduct negative incur a cost; those who consider it
positive either are unaffected or incur a benefit from the conduct.
22. Expressly recognizing that an individual response to particular conduct can be either
positive or negative circumscribes the importance of whether the challenged conduct is "sexual"
or not. The "sexual" aspect of conduct is important only to the extent it affects the positive or
negative value an individual associates with the conduct.
23. See, for example, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Feminism Without Illusions 33-54 (U.N.C.,
1991) (arguing that feminist thoughts focusing on individualist notions of "empowerment" are
misguided; surrender to the "community" will lead to a better life for women). The notion that
group relations take primacy over individual ones stems from the unsupported premise that
434
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determined by asking the individual exposed to the sexual conduct if
she feels harmed. If she truthfully says yes, then she is harmed, or, in
other words, she has suffered a loss. But if she says no, then she is
not harmed, regardless of how another person may have answered the
question.
A corollary to the premise that benefit or loss reflects individ-
ual preferences is the notion that, at least at the outset of the inquiry,
no conduct is inherently good or bad. The loss or gain one person
experiences is a product of the interaction of that person and another
person and the way the law allocates the consequences of that interac-
tion. For example, suppose a skeet shooting range is located next to a
funeral home. The presence of the range next to the funeral home
results in a loss to the home unless the funeral home is entitled to an
injunction against the skeet shooting range, in which case the close
proximity of the funeral home results in a loss to the range. This
example hopefully pares away biases and preconceptions to reveal the
point that the noise from skeet shooting is not, at the outset, intrinsi-
cally virtuous or blameworthy, any more than is the funeral home
patrons' preference for quiet.
The current scholarship ignores the fact that loss from sexual
conduct is a product of the interaction between men and women.2 4
Writers refer to the complaining woman as the "victim" and the
defendant as the "injurer."2s But a woman is no more a victim of a
man's crude remarks than a man is a victim of the woman's
sensitivity to them. Scholarship that characterizes defendants in
women reject notions of self-determination and individual choice in favor of other, usually
unspecified values such as "compassion." See Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984
Duke L. J. 447, 479 (stating that "[many women appear to see individual autonomy as threaten-
ing not only their security in a web of relationships, but also their very sense of self"). Susan
Kupfer identified the "dichotomy" of individual and community in feminist thought: "The
possibility of autonomy for individual women risks subscribing to liberal ideology, with its known
inequities; yet, focus on community flirts with reductionism, seeing women as only connected to
others." Susan Kupfer, Autonomy and Community in Feminist Legal Thought, 22 Golden Gate U.
L. Rev. 583-84 (1992). She observes that the "dichotomy" is somewhat artificial, a viewpoint she
coins as "postmodern." Id. at 586. Kupfer correctly concludes: "There is no reason that autono-
mous individuals cannot be joined by an interest or goal in transformative imaginings of the
possibilities of difference." Id. at 590. See also Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy:
Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 Yale J. L. & Fem. 7-8 (1989).
24. That injuries are a cost of both the injurer and the victim's conduct is a fundamental
premise in the work of Ronald Coase. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. &
Econ. 1 (1960).
25. "Victim" appears to refer to the person on whom the incidence of loss from sexual
conduct initially falls before any rule of law shifts the loss to someone else. The "injurer" is thus
the person whose conduct is at issue. On the emerging importance of victimhood in our law and
culture, see Charles J. Sykes, A Nation of Victims: The Decay of the American Character (St.
Martin's, 1992); Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1411 (1993).
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sexual harassment cases as "injurers" and plaintiffs as "victims"
presupposes an ethic under which plaintiffs' values morally trump
those of defendants. The choice of language obscures the ultimate
question: when should one type of conduct yield to another? To
answer the question requires a means of identifying what is "fair" and
"moral" based on principles that do not preordain the outcome.2 1
The goal is to identify a paradigm for allocating loss from sex-
ual conduct that creates incentive for investment in the optimal
amount of precaution. Thus, the paradigm proposed reflects the nor-
mative conclusion that loss allocation should achieve allocative effi-
ciency. Some writers criticize the normative economic theory of tort
law27 underlying the proposed paradigm as immoral.28 Resolution of
these conflicting viewpoints is beyond the scope of this Article, if not
impossible.2 9 In any event, it is not necessary to embrace the norma-
tive theory to find merit in economic analysis as a policy tool. Wealth-
maximization frequently is subverted in favor of some other social
goal. Identifying the economically optimal allocation provides a met-
ric of the social cost of a competing policy. Certainly, ignoring the
social cost of policy does not make the cost go away. Sober recognition
of that cost may not be politically expedient, but it is honest.
B. Toward the Optimal Level of Sexual Conduct Loss
1. A Model of Rational Behavior
Under conditions of scarcity, all conduct produces both benefit
and cost.30 One of the central assumptions underlying economic the-
ory is that a decisionmaker will shape her behavior to achieve the
greatest benefit at the least cost.31 She will engage in conduct up to
26. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent
Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. Legal Stud. 187 (1981).
27. The normative theory of economic analysis posits that an efficient allocation of loss is
the fair one.'
28. See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 191 (1980).
29. For a discussion of the tension between justice and efficiency in the common law, see
Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 485 (1980).
30. See, for example, Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. Legal
Stud. 13, 25 (1972).
31. See Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government and an Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation 125, 298 (Oxford U., Harrison ed. 1948). A recurring criticism of the
economic analysis of law is that it is premised on unrealistic assumptions regarding human
behavior. See, for example, Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Li-
ability, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 677, 685 n.46 (1985); G. Edward White, Tort Law in America An Intellec-
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the point at which the benefit of the conduct no longer exceeds the
cost. This is the economically optimal level of conduct because it is
wealth-maximizing. Conduct in excess of the optimal level depletes
the decisionmaker's wealth because the benefit of additional conduct
would be less than the cost to undertake it. At a level of conduct lower
than the optimal level, the decisionmaker could become wealthier by
incurring cost for a greater benefit.32
To illustrate with non-controversial conduct, consider crossing
a busy street. It yields a benefit by providing access to the other side
of the street. It also imposes a cost by increasing the risk of being
injured by an automobile driving on the street. The increased risk of
injury creates a present cost equal to the probability of the injury
times the magnitude of loss, if it occurs. This risk of injury from the
conduct is called the expected loss.3 Thus, assuming rational conduct,
a pedestrian will cross the street as long as the benefit of doing so
outweighs the expected loss.
Sexual conduct similarly yields both benefits and costs. The
person enjoying the benefits, however, may be able to externalize
some or all of the costs. 34 Unlike the pedestrian who bears both the
benefits and costs of crossing the street, a worker displaying nude
photographs of women around his work area enjoys the benefit but
tual History, 220-23, 230 (Oxford U., 1980); Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative
Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 Yale L. J. 697 (1978). William Landes and Richard Posner respond
to this critique by pointing to statistical evidence that shows the deterrent effect of law. For
example, statistical evidence regarding the certainty and severity of criminal sanctions and the
level of criminal activity illustrates the practical implementation of rational human conduct.
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 10-11 (Harvard
U., 1987). See also Christopher J. Bruce, The Deterrent Effects of Automobile Insurance and Tort
Law: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 6 L. & Pol'y 67, 84-90 (1984); Jerry Wiley, The Impact
of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An Empirical Study, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 345, 383-84
(1982).
32. This underlying assumption does not mean that economists assume, or believe, that
humans or legal entities always act rationally. The assumption that people act to make them-
selves better off implies that people respond to incentives. In other words, the economic model of
rational conduct is built on the assumption that if a person's surroundings change so that by
changing her conduct, she can make herself better off, she will do so. See Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law at 4 (cited in note 4). The extent to which a person will change her conduct in re-
sponse to a change in conditions is outside the scope of economic theory. Measuring the magni-
tude of change in conduct in response to incentives requires empirical analysis of the elasticity of
conduct with respect to the changed conditions.
33. Expressed as a formula: E = PL, where E is the expected loss, P is the probability of the
loss, and L is the magnitude of the loss, if it occurs.
34. The biologically derived ability of men to externalize to women one of the costs of sexual
intercourse (the risk of pregnancy) is at the heart of the controversy over abortion rights. See, for
example, Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 1016-28
(1984); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 Yale L. J. 1281,
1309-24 (1991).
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does not bear the entire cost. Assume that the worker can impose
costs on his co-workers but that no law requires him to compensate
them. Because some of the costs of the worker's conduct therefore fall
on other workers, he can externalize the cost.35
When an individual can externalize some or all of the costs of
his conduct, the individual's decision regarding whether to engage in
the conduct, although privately optimal, is not socially optimal.36 A
level of conduct is socially optimal when the aggregate benefits of such
conduct are maximized in relation to the average costs measured over
all participants in the society. If an individual takes into account all
costs and benefits of his conduct, he will engage in it until the total
benefit to him maximally exceeds the total cost.3 7 Thus, if the worker
is forced to consider all the costs of his conduct, including the cost he
imposes on his co-workers, his private decision whether to display
nude photographs at work will be socially optimal.3,
Regardless of whether he considers only his own costs, or costs
initially borne by others that he internalizes, an individual can reduce
the costs of conduct by taking precautions. For example, the worker
could reduce the expected loss from the display of his photographs by
posting them in his locker, rather than on the shop floor. Assuming
that the worker could be forced to internalize the costs of his conduct
fully, before he decides where to post the pictures he would weigh the
expected costs to his co-workers if he chooses the more private location
as opposed to the more public one. Restricting display of the
photographs to his locker is precautionary conduct. It would lower the
probability that a co-worker would be injured, thus reducing the ex-
pected loss from his conduct relative to the expected loss if he posts
the photographs on the shop floor.39
35. The cost imposed on co-workers from the presence of nude photographs of women in
their workplace is an externality of the worker's conduct.
36. See generally A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 134, 192 (Macmillan, 4th ed. 1932).
37. Costs are internalized when a decisionmaker's self-interest yields the same result as the
economic conception of public interest-minimized private costs equal minimized social costs. See
Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1,
4 n.8 (1985).
38. Whether display of sexually explicit material in the workplace creates a hostile work
environment actionable under Title VII is controversial. Compare Andrews v. City of Philadel-
phia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990), with Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622
(6th Cir. 1986).
39. Recall that the expected cost is the product of the probability of loss and the magnitude
of loss (PL). IfP is lowered, the product of P and L will be smaller.
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In other words, precautions yield a benefit in the form of a
lower expected loss.40 But precautions, like all conduct, involve both
benefit and cost. Confining his photographs to his locker imposes a
cost on the worker, assuming he would derive additional benefit by
displaying them on the shop floor. His cost equals his foregone en-
joyment.41 In the context of sexual conduct at work, the costs of pre-
caution are sometimes subtle, but in all cases are real. For example,
if an employer hires a floor supervisor to monitor the conversations of
workers in order to detect and report sexual innuendo, the supervi-
sor's salary is a cost of precaution to the employer. Workers bear a
companion cost of this precaution-reduced privacy and autonomy at
work. If an individual worker interrupts her work to tell her co-
worker she does not appreciate his lewd commentary, her lost privacy
is a cost to her; her lost productivity is a cost to her employer.
A rational person will only undertake the precaution as long as
the potential benefit (reduction in expected loss) exceeds the cost.42 At
this point, an additional investment in precaution would not yield an
offsetting benefit in the form of a reduction in expected loss. The
optimal level of precaution thus is not necessarily the one that pre-
vents all injury. Some loss may still occur at the optimal level because
it is cheaper to endure the loss than to prevent it.
Note one further complication: in the case of sexual conduct, as
in virtually all human interaction, both the actor and the reactor can
take precautions to reduce expected cost. For example, the workers in
the path of injury could avoid the area on the shop floor where the
40. When the expected loss = PL, precautions are those actions that lower either P or L or
both. For example, wearing a helmet when bicycling does not reduce the probability of being hit
by a car, but it does reduce the magnitude of loss.
41. Such precautionary conduct is costly even though it is not readily measurable in dollar
terms. The value of something to an individual is measured by reference to the amount an
individual would pay to acquire it or demand to part with it, as the case may be. When no explicit
market transaction occurs, this amount sometimes is referred to as a "shadow price." See, for
example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 16 (cited in note 4). For example, leisure time has
value even though it is not bought or sold on a market. The value of leisure is measured by
reference to the opportunity cost of leisure, that is, the amount of work income an individual
forgoes in favor of relaxing.
42. In other words, the optimal level of care is the point at which a small change in the cost
of precaution reduces the expected accident loss by the same amount. See Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law at 164 n.2 (cited in note 4). The optimal level of precaution is expressed more
accurately in this way, as a marginal concept. Each additional increment of precaution
presumably has a diminishing effect in preventing loss. At the same time, it is also assumed that
each additional increment of precaution costs more than the previous increment because
resources committed to precaution are scarce and increased demand for them yields increased
cost. Id. at 165 & fig. 6.1.
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photographs are displayed, or avoid the workplace altogether.4 Either
type of precautionary conduct is costly to the worker, the latter cost-
lier than the former. When more than one person can take precau-
tions against loss, the efficient solution calls for the person who can
prevent the loss most cheaply to do so.
Assuming full internalization of costs, the worker wishing to
display the photographs might pay his co-workers to take precautions
if they could do so more cheaply than he could.-4 In reality, workers
probably do not make such bargains because the costs of striking the
bargain outweigh the benefits.45 Courts and loss allocation rules enter
the picture when private bargaining cannot be expected to result in an
efficient arrangement.46 In a world without transaction costs, rational
individuals would bargain among themselves to ensure that the total
package of precaution they collectively take would yield the greatest
amount of benefit to the group at the lowest possible cost. But, in the
practical world, transaction costs exist. Collectively imposed loss
allocation rules provide a substitute path to the optimal level of pre-
caution when transaction costs inhibit a voluntary exchange.
Sexual harassment, when it occurs in the workplace, involves
transaction costs lower than those facing, for example, strangers who
meet because of a car accident. The potential defendant and plaintiff
are employer and employee or co-workers. In some cases, the parties
have entered into an express employment contract, but few contracts
contain an express agreement about the incidence of loss from sexual
conduct. Notwithstanding relatively lower transaction costs, employ-
ers and employees do not expressly allocate sexual conduct loss
through contract terms.47
43. Numerous commentators dispute the notion that women can prevent sexual conduct
loss. See, for example, Korn, 67 Tulane L. Rev. at 1392-93 (cited in note 16).
44. See generally Coase, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (cited in note 24) (claiming that if transactions
are costless, the initial assignment of an entitlement will not prevent efficient use of resources).
45. The transaction costs of striking such a bargain include the virtually infinite costs of de-
termining which co-workers would be injured by the pictures in order to identify those potentially
able to take precautions.
46. Contract law concerns relationships between people for whom the ex ante costs of
bargaining are relatively low (low enough that the costs of reaching an agreement do not exceed
the benefits). Tort rules, on the other hand, concern relationships between people for whom the
ex ante costs of bargaining are relatively high, and thus they cannot by private agreement allocate
loss between them. See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 341 (cited in note 14).
47. In any event, determining the optimal level of loss under common-law contract rules
would involve approximately the same analysis as the negligence determination under tort rules.
Common-law rules, whether contract, property, or tort, all tend to allocate loss, under the
identical paradigm, to the party who ex ante could bear the loss more cheaply. Cooter, 73 Cal. L.
Rev. 1 (cited in note 37). When parties to a contract fail to allocate loss expressly, the court does
so by implying a contract term. Id. To achieve efficiency, the process of implication should
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One economic explanation may be that even in the employment
context, the transaction costs of reaching an express allocation of
sexual conduct loss are too high. In other words, the benefit from such
negotiation, in terms of reduction in expected loss, generally does not
outweigh the cost of negotiation. Transaction costs are lower than
between virtual strangers, but not low enough to induce express
allocation of loss. The absence of express allocation is not surprising
because the very issues that complicate (and raise the cost of) creation
of a social allocation raise the cost of reaching a private allocation. 48
2. The Paradigm
The proposed paradigm can be articulated as follows: a person
should be liable for sexual conduct loss only if his cost of precaution
was less than the expected loss, and the plaintiff could not have
avoided the loss at an even lower cost.49 The paradigm, which evalu-
ates conduct by reference to the costs of precaution and expected loss,
is based on the negligence rule that has come to be called the Hand
formula, after Judge Learned Hand, who first articulated it ex-
pressly. 5° Like the Hand formula, the paradigm encourages preven-
tion of loss up to the point at which the saved loss is no longer worth
the price of precaution.
Just as some loss-producing conduct is not negligent, some loss-
producing sexual conduct, under the proposed paradigm, will not be
ccsexual harassment." The paradigm thus optimizes, rather than
allocate loss to the party who would have agreed to accept the risk of loss had the parties
expressly bargained over it. Accordingly, the law can reduce transaction costs, and increase social
wealth, by placing liability on the party who would have contracted for it. See, for example,
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 164 (cited in note 4); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of
Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L. J. 1231, 1241 (1984). This observation raises the possibility of
pursuing workplace sexual harassment claims as breaches of contract, the exploration of which is
beyond the scope of this Article.
48. The cost of negotiating a private allocation of risk is especially significant if the prob-
ability or magnitude of a given loss is low compared to the value of the contract to the parties.
This may be the case with risk of loss from sexual conduct. See generally Sykes, 93 Yale L. J. at
1242-43 (cited in note 47). Moreover, employer-employee relations are and have been heavily
regulated through labor laws and worker compensation systems. The effect of these regulations
on transaction costs is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the economics of
allocation of risk of injury in the labor market, see W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating
Health and Safety in the Workplace (Harvard U., 1983).
49. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 32
(1972); Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1915).
50. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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minimizes, the amount of sexual conduct loss.51 The result under the
paradigm, although quite unremarkable for other loss, no doubt ren-
ders the paradigm unacceptable to some feminist writers.
These writers argue, either implicitly or explicitly, that all loss
from sexual conduct must be eliminated without regard to the cost.5
Regrettably, in a world of exhaustible resources, there is no way to
escape the balancing of costs and benefits.3 Ignoring the cost of policy
does not eliminate that cost. Even if the only morally acceptable goal
is the elimination of negative sexual conduct, the paradigm
illuminates the cost of achieving that outcome.
Any loss allocation rule has two functions: compensation and
incentive creation.M The negligence rule, for example, provides a
means by which a plaintiff can obtain compensation when she can
establish that the defendant failed to take due care for her safety, or,
in other words, negligently caused her injury.55 At the same time, the
decision in a particular case provides incentive for potential defen-
dants and plaintiffs to take due care, that is, to invest in the minimal
level of care necessary to escape ultimate liability for loss. Potential
plaintiffs have an incentive to take precautions to reduce or eliminate
the risk to them remaining after a potential defendant has taken due
care for their safety. The proposed paradigm incorporates the
incentive-creating potential of the negligence rule with the goal of
wealth maximization. Simply stated, under the paradigm, a plaintiff
51. Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 13 (cited in note 31). Most
commentators and some courts interpret Title VII as imposing a positive duty on employers to
maintain a "harassment free" workplace. See, for example, Merriman and Yang, 13 N.Y.U. Rev.
L. & Soc. Change at 98 (cited in note 19); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1977). This interpretation is
not inconsistent with the result under the paradigm, which confines "harassment" to loss-causing
conduct that could have been prevented more cheaply.
52. See, for example, Korn, 67 Tulane L. Rev. at 1386 (cited in note 43) (arguing that
"[a]lthough sexual harassment is commonplace, we need not accept it as a risk inherent in the
workplace. It can, unlike true industrial accidents, be eliminated.").
53. See Guido Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes and the Law: Private Law Perspectives
on a Public Law Problem (Syracuse U., 1985).
54. Scholars criticizing courts' interpretation of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation are apparently cognizant of its function as a loss allocation rule. See Merriman and Yang,
13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 105 (cited in note 19) (citing the "dual objectives" of Title VII:
to eliminate all forms of discrimination in employment and to make victims whole).
55. Some writers in the legal-realist movement argued that the only function of tort law
was the provision of social insurance. See, for example, William 0. Douglas, Vicarious Liability
and Administration of Risk 1, 38 Yale L. J. 584 (1929); Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence
to Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1951); Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsid.
ered. The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 Yale L. J. 549 (1948). Like some of their feminist
successors, these writers advocated placing liability on "deep pocket" injurers regardless of the
fault of the injurer or the conduct of the victim.
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is entitled to compensation when granting compensation would create
incentives toward the optimal level of precaution in the future.-
The negligence rule creates incentives for both potential defen-
dants and plaintiffs to take due care.5 7 Because both men and women
can take precaution to avoid loss from negative sexual conduct,8 the
negligence rule provides a useful model for a sexual conduct loss
paradigm. In contrast, rules of no liability or strict liability provide
inadequate incentives for precaution when both parties can take pre-
caution. If the rule of law is no liability, the defendant has no incen-
tive to take precaution and thus will take none. Conversely, if the
rule is strict liability with no defenses based on the plaintiffs conduct,
the plaintiff has no incentive to take precaution.59
Suppose an employer can avoid one hundred dollars' worth of
sexual conduct loss to a worker by taking a precaution that costs ten
dollars. Further suppose that the worker also can avoid the loss, but
only by taking a precaution that costs one thousand dollars. Under
the paradigm, the employer would be liable for its failure to take the
ten dollar precaution. This rule provides employers with an incentive
to take precaution against sexual conduct loss up to the point at which
the cost of an incremental increase in precaution would not reduce
expected loss by an offsetting amount.6 0
Now suppose that the worker can avoid the same loss by tak-
ing a precaution that costs five dollars. In this case, applying the
56. Richard Posner has observed that avoiding the wasting of social resources may itself be
an important moral value. He observed:
Because we do not like to see resources squandered, a judgment of negligence has
inescapable overtones of moral disapproval, for it implies that there was a cheaper alter-
native to the accident. Conversely, there is no moral indignation in the case in which the
cost of prevention would have exceeded the cost of the accident. Where the measures
necessary to avert the accident would have consumed excessive resources, there is no oc-
casion to condemn the defendant for not having taken them.
Posner, 1 J. Legal Stud. at 33 (cited in note 49).
57. To illustrate, suppose that by taking a cost-justified amount of precaution, a potential
defendant could reduce expected loss, but not to zero. The defendant would not be negligent (and
thus not liable to the plaintiff) if the loss occurred notwithstanding the precautions. Potential
plaintiffs bear this residual risk and have incentives to take cost-justified precautions to reduce it.
58. See note 43 and accompanying text.
59. John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323, 338
(1973). If, because of imprecision in the system, the victim does not receive full compensation, the
victim will have an incentive to take precaution to the extent of the under-compensation. This
incentive is unrelated to the efficient level of precaution, however, and will not achieve efficiency.
See Cooter, 73 Cal. L. Rev. at 6 (cited in note 37). In many cases purportedly applying strict
liability, contributory negligence or some variation of it is a defense. See W. Page Keeton, et al.,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 79 at 565-66 (West, 5th ed. 1984).
60. In this hypothetical, the employer would be liable for failing to invest in precaution up
to $100.
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paradigm results in a judgment for the employer. Even though the
employer could have prevented the worker's loss for a cost much lower
than the total reduction in expected loss, the worker could have done
so even more cheaply. To create an incentive for similarly situated
workers to take the cheaper five dollar precaution in the future, the
law should allocate loss to the worker.61 Under the paradigm, if both
parties have taken precaution at less than the optimal level, the loss
should fall on the party who could have avoided it more cheaply.
The negligence rule, with its bilateral incentive-creating capac-
ity, appears especially well-suited to the allocation of sexual conduct
loss. Unlike an absolute liability rule, the negligence model acknowl-
edges and exploits the capacity of both the sexual actor and reactor to
reduce the risk of sexual conduct loss. The relative effectiveness of the
various permutations of the negligence principle, as opposed to abso-
lute liability rules, in maximizing social wealth has engendered much
scholarly debate.6 2  In particular, scholars disagree on the relative
efficiency of negligence and strict liability loss allocation schemes.
This Article holds these arguments in abeyance and adopts the negli-
gence rule as a paradigmatic starting point.
2. "Reasonable" Conduct and Social Consensus
The paradigm creates a definition of "sexual harassment" un-
der which liability decisions minimize sexual conduct loss relative to
the cost of preventing it. The conduct identified as legally prohibited
should be coextensive with that conduct which results in loss that
61. If both parties' costs of prevention were lower than the reduction of expected loss
resulting from such precaution, why should the defendant get off scot free? The economic answer
is that holding such a defendant liable for injury to such a plaintiff creates an insignificant
additional incentive for the defendant to take additional precaution. Conversely, a rule that
relieves a negligent defendant from liability for injury to a contributorily negligent plaintiff does
not significantly affect the plaintiffs incentives. See Posner, 1 J. Legal Stud. at 39-40 (cited in
note 49). The common law, through contributory negligence, lets the chips fall where they may on
the premise that the costs of shifting the loss from a negligent plaintiff to a negligent defendant
are not justified by a potential increase in social wealth. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at
171 (cited in note 4).
Most states have replaced the defense of contributory negligence with comparative negli-
gence, but this change does not affect the incentives for precaution built into the negligence rule.
Comparative negligence preserves the same incentives because it does not come into play unless
the defendant was negligent. Thus, regardless of whether the plaintiff will be totally barred or
proportionately barred from recovery if she is negligent, a potential plaintiff still has incentive to
take precautions against residual risk. Comparative negligence yields a transfer payment to a
negligent plaintiff but does not affect the incentives for efficient conduct built into the Hand
formula.
62. Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 125-26 (cited in note 31).
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would have been cheaper to prevent. Thus, challenged sexual conduct
is actionable "sexual harassment" only if the cost to the defendant of
preventing the loss was less than the expected loss, and the plaintiff
could not have avoided the loss at an even lower cost.
The paradigm allocates sexual conduct loss by focusing on the
expected loss from the conduct and the cost of preventing it. Determin-
ing the expected loss and the cost of precaution in the context of sex-
ual conduct is no easy matter. Nonetheless, so focusing the inquiry
illuminates some of the reasons why the law governing sexual conduct
is fraught with controversy.
Perhaps the most obvious problem is measuring costs in the
absence of market indicators. The paradigm cannot yield scientifically
precise results in the absence of precise data. Even in the absence of
market "prices," however, the cost of sexual conduct loss and the cost
of preventing it are measurable at least in part by observing rough,
yet absolute, changes in human dignity, personal integrity, and
freedom of expression. Although these aspects of human identity and
interaction are not traded on a recognizable market at an identifiable
market price, they indisputably have value.63 To oversimplify, more of
any of these aspects make an individual better off, while less make an
individual worse off. Although the effects of sexual conduct are not all
susceptible to cardinal measurements, ordinal relationships may be
observable. The paradigm inquires into the cost of preventing sexual
conduct loss and the expectation of loss at a certain level of conduct.
It is not impossible to conclude, in a given circumstance, that a trivial
additional investment in precaution would have yielded a huge reduc-
tion in expected loss.
The second problem is identifying costs over a heterogenous
society. So far, discussion of the paradigm has focused on the costs of
precaution and expected loss to individuals experiencing sexual con-
duct loss. But the costs of determining individualized costs in each
case likely would swamp the efficiency benefits of the loss allocation
scheme.6 4 For this reason, the paradigm adopts the negligence rule's
63. Indeed, common-law courts routinely balance such non-market values in tort actions.
64. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 169 (cited in note 4); Landes and Posner, The
Economic Structure of Tort Law at 123-27 (cited in note 31). Naomi Cahn's discussion of her
proposal for adjudicating sexual harassment claims illustrates the virtually infinite cost of
determining individual, subjective reality: 'This does not mean that we should make women's
experiences the only reality; we must recognize that there are multiple realities. A new standard
could recognize the multidimensional nature of disputes and experiences of reality. Instead of
labelling the male reality the 'objective' one, each reality is both objective and subjective for the
participants." Cahn, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1437 (cited in note 8) (citation omitted). See also Holly
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mechanism of estimating the average capacity (or the capacity of a
"reasonable person," using the language of negligence) for avoiding or
enduring a loss.65 Put another Way, a defendant will be liable under
either scheme if he did not take "due care" to avoid loss, regardless of
his actual, subjectively measured capacity to avoid or endure loss.
Due care thus is a surrogate for the socially optimal level of precau-
tion in a given case. "Due care" or "reasonable conduct" is the level of
precaution that, on average, is socially optimal.
Substituting average costs as a surrogate for individual ones
can result in inefficiency, at least in the context of a particular case.
To illustrate, suppose a defendant could have prevented an accident
with an expected cost of one hundred dollars by taking a precaution
that would have cost her one hundred and fifty dollars. Not
surprisingly, the defendant did not take the precaution and an
accident occurred. Further suppose that the "average person's" cost of
taking the same precaution was twenty dollars. Using average costs
as a surrogate for the defendant's actual costs, the defendant would be
liable, even though the judgment will not induce the defendant to take
additional precaution in the future.66 On the other hand, suppose an
exceptional person could have avoided the loss at a cost of ten dollars.
Now, using average costs as a surrogate, the exceptional person would
escape liability, even though he did not invest in the optimal level of
precaution given his individual costs.67
A standard of care based on average costs may be efficient in
the end, however, because it creates incentives for individuals to
adjust their future conduct so they can better behave as reasonable
persons. For example, an illiterate person's cost of preventing loss by
reading a warning label is very high relative to a literate person's cost.
Not permitting an illiterate person to recover for loss in a given case
provides illiterate persons with incentives to learn to read. The
Fechner, Note, Toward an Expanded Conception of Law Reform: Sexual Harassment Law and
Reconstruction of Facts, 230 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 475, 487 (1990).
65. The finder of fact compares the conduct of the defendant with that of a "reasonable
person." If the defendant took the precautions a reasonable person would have taken and
nonetheless the loss occurred, then the defendant is not negligent, and the plaintiff must bear the
loss. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 108 (Little, Brown, 1881) (explaining
that a person may be negligent if, though he did his best, he was just clumsier than average). On
the other hand, if the defendant did not take the precautions a reasonable person would have
taken (even though he did the best he could), the court requires the defendant to compensate the
plaintiff for her loss.
66. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff in this case would be a transfer payment with no
efficiency effect. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 167 (cited in note 4); Landes and Posner,
The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 124-25 (cited in note 31).
67. Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 124.25.
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resulting increase in literacy and decrease in loss may be efficient in
the long run even though, in a particular case, an illiterate person
would have found it too costly to protect against the loss given her
inability to read.
Substituting average costs in the guise of "reasonable conduct"
or "due care" for individual costs is economically justifiable, notwith-
standing its potential for inefficiency, if it minimizes the total costs
(including the social cost of inefficient results) of allocating loss rela-
tive to efficiency gains.68 The lower the accuracy of a standard of care,
the greater the cost, in terms of lost efficiency, of implementing it as a
means to allocate loss.
To illustrate the use of average costs as a surrogate for indi-
vidual ones, consider how the paradigm would work for ordinary,
uncontroversial conduct. Suppose, for example, that two people are
moving household goods packed in heavy boxes. If a box falls, it will
cause injury proportionate to the bone mass of the person on which it
falls. A smaller-boned person will incur a relatively more serious
injury than a larger-boned person. Assume further that one of the
movers is a woman. Accept for the moment that the challenged
conduct is one for which women as a group are likely to experience a
relatively higher magnitude of loss than men.69 Now assume that the
other mover drops a box, injuring the woman.
In this circumstance, the proper standard of care for the defen-
dant is one that takes the woman's relatively higher expected loss into
account. Her relatively greater vulnerability to injury was readily
observable to the other mover prior to the occurrence of the loss-pro-
ducing conduct. When an individual belongs to an easily identifiable
group that is peculiarly susceptible to loss from an injury, a standard
of care based on that group's characteristics will increase the accuracy
of the standard as an indicator of the individual's capacities at a rela-
tively low cost. The cost of using this special standard depends on the
costs of gathering information about the particular capacities of the
group. The more easily observable the particular capacities are, the
lower the costs of gathering information about them.
68. Using average costs as a surrogate for individual costs, notwithstanding the potential
for inefficient results, is a relatively inexpensive means of evaluating conduct compared to the
cost of gathering information about an individual's subjective costs of precaution or expected loss.
See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 167 (cited in note 4).
69. The greater magnitude of loss for women yields a greater expected loss from the
conduct to women than to men.
1994l
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The example illustrates the use of a group-specific standard of
care as a surrogate for the determination of an individual's expected
loss. 70 Group-specific standards also can be cost-effective surrogates
for individualized determinations of the cost of precaution.
Continuing the foregoing example, suppose the mover who dropped
the box was a young man. Assume that the only way the young man
could have prevented this accident was by exerting upper body
strength against the errant box. Again, accept for the moment that
men, on average, have a greater capacity for upper body strength than
women. Because, in these circumstances, gender correlates with the
cost of precaution, an individual man's cost of precaution should be
measured by reference to the average cost to men, rather than the
average cost to all people (including women). The characteristic of
gender is readily observable and reliably indicates a cost of precaution
at variance with the average over all members of society.71
To maximize efficiency, the paradigm for sexual conduct loss
should implement standards of care based on their relative accuracy
as surrogates for individual costs. In the case of sexual conduct loss,
men are the likely actors and women are the likely reactors. The
characteristics of gender are easily observable, but whereas the ob-
servable characteristic of gender reliably indicates higher costs of
precaution and expected loss for women relative to men in the box-
lifting example, the characteristic of gender does not invariably indi-
cate costs and loss with respect to sexual conduct.
In the foregoing example, the reader accepted, hopefully with-
out controversy, that women on average have lower bone mass than
men and that men on average have greater upper body strength than
women. By directing the reader to accept these characteristics as
common to the group, the discussion assumed that there is a costless
and perfectly accurate way of determining group-specific average
costs. Of course, no such method exists. The more disparate costs are
70. Under the paradigm, the plaintiffs cost of precaution is compared to the expected loss.
71. The common law has recognized that certain plaintiffs have a lower capacity to exercise
care for their own safety than "ordinary" members of society. See, for example, Memorial Hosp. v.
Scott, 261 Ind. 27, 300 N.E.2d 50 (1973) (holding a plaintiff with multiple sclerosis not
contributorily negligent for pushing the hot water knob rather than the toilet flusher). See also
LaCava v. New Orleans, 159 S.2d 362 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (finding that disability due to old age af-
fects the standard of care). Guido Calabresi has observed that the common law is more willing to
accommodate plaintiffs' reduced capacity to protect themselves from harm than defendants'
reduced capacity to take precaution against injury to others. Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes
and the Law at 32-33 (cited in note 53).
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among a particular group, the more expensive it is to determine the
average.7 2
The question of what constitutes reasonable sexual conduct in
the workplace provokes controversy because people disagree about
average costs. This problem is inherent in developing a benchmark of
reasonable conduct when the conduct at issue is sexual conduct.
Intuitively, tastes for sexual conduct would appear to vary more
widely than tastes for less subjective activity, like swimming, for
example. Moreover, variance among tastes for sexual conduct is not
uniformly diverse. Rather, tastes for some sexual conduct will vary
less (more like swimming) than those for other sexual conduct. For
example, most people would characterize violent sexual assault as
negative sexual conduct imposing a large loss on the victim. In con-
trast, a sexual remark, such as a comment about a co-worker's physi-
cal appearance, would likely evoke a much wider array of responses,
ranging from negative to positive.
Apart from the wide variation in tastes for sexual conduct,
costs do not appear to correlate invariably with readily observable
characteristics like gender. For some sexual conduct, for example, the
threat of physical sexual assault, gender may provide an easily
observable and reliable indicator of high expected loss. As for other
sexual conduct, for example, a sexual remark, gender may indicate
high expected loss; then again, it may not. In either case, gender
alone does not provide easily observable information about how much
higher than average a particular reactor's expected loss might be.
III. APPLICATION OF THE PARADIGM TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The legal response to loss from sexual conduct in the workplace
has taken three forms. This Article focuses on the first and vastly
more significant form, which treats sexual harassment on the job as a
form of sex discrimination prohibited under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.13 A worker can also pursue a tort remedy, or a
72. The increased expense is attributable in part to information costs associated with
gathering data about a particular group and in part to the increased capacity for inefficiency.
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). Title VII provides in relevant part: "(a) It shall
be unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Persons can challenge the sexual discrimination
of state employers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) by alleging that the employer's conduct deprived
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workers' compensation claim.74  Although these legal responses are
different, they share many common features. Under either Title VII
or tort theories, the central question is the same: When should a
defendant be required to compensate a plaintiff for sexual conduct
loss?
Anti-discrimination law reflects social policy to achieve equality
in employment opportunity and to compensate persons subject to
employment discrimination based on sex and certain other personal
characteristics. 75  Congress left it to the courts to determine what
conduct constitutes "discrimination" and, accordingly, when the victim
of discrimination is entitled to compensation. 76  Allocating sexual
conduct loss to maximize social wealth is not inconsistent with
Congress's broad mandate. Consideration of economic efficiency can
and should guide the courts in deciding sexual harassment cases.
Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an
employer.., to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's ... sex."77 Less than twenty years ago, a court
recognized that certain sexual conduct can constitute discrimination
based on sex under Title VII. 78  Since then, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (the EEOC) has promulgated guidelines that
the employee of the federal constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law. See, for
example, Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 220-21 (1988).
74. See, for example, Wangler v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 742 F. Supp. 1465, 1467 (D. Haw.
1990); O'Connell v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686, 511 N.E.2d 349, 350 (1987). See also Korn, 67 Tulane
L. Rev. at 1379-80 (cited in note 43) (arguing that a workers' compensation remedy should not be
the exclusive remedy for a worker alleging injury from sexual conduct). The courts appear split
on this issue. See id. at 1380 n.94.
75. See, for example, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
76. Richard Posner has posited that legislatures enact statutes that leave broad interpreta-
tion and implementation to the courts because the costs of statutory production of legal rules is
high. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 542-43 (cited in note 4).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). "Employer" means "a person [individual or organiza-
tion] engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any
agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
78. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.,
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978), remanded sub nom., Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F.
Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980). See also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v.
Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Products,
Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). Before 1976 and Saxbe, courts generally ruled that conduct
now referred to as sexual harassment was not discrimination based on sex. See, for example,
Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.
1977); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.
1979).
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purport to define actionable sexual conduct, that is, sexual har-
assment.7 9
The guidelines recognize two distinct forms of sexual harass-
ment: quid pro quo harassment and hostile work environment har-
assment. Quid pro quo harassment occurs when the harasser condi-
tions employment benefits on submission to sexual conduct., For
example, a person engages in quid pro quo harassment when he fires
a worker for refusing to engage in sexual conduct, or denies her a
promotion or other employment benefit for the same reason.8' The
second type, hostile work environment harassment, occurs when a
harasser engages in "conduct [that] ... unreasonably interfer[es] with
an individual's work performance or creat[es] an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive working environment."2 Quid pro quo harassment can be
inflicted only by a worker's supervisor, but hostile work environment
79. The EEOC guidelines read as follows:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII. Unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to
or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably in-
terfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or of-
fensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992) (footnote omitted). EEOC guidelines do not have the force of law;
however, courts have relied on them implicitly and explicitly in deciding sexual harassment cases.
See, for example, General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
80. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) & (2). Before Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
which recognized hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII for the first time,
the only actionable sexual conduct was quid pro quo sexual harassment. See, for example, Walter
v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309 (D.C.N.D. 1981).
81. See, for example, Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990); Jones v.
Wesco Investments, Inc., 846 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406
(10th Cir. 1987); Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Caleshu v. Merrill Lynch, et
al., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Mo. 1990). Quid pro quo harassment also can take the form of an
inducement rather than a threat. For example, the harasser may condition an employment
benefit on the victim's performance of sexual acts.
82. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a)(3)). See also Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). In Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court expanded
actionable sexual conduct to include hostile work environment sexual harassment because
otherwise an employer could harass an employee "with impunity by carefully stepping short of
firing the employee or taking any other tangible actions against her in response to her resis-
tance." Id. at 945. Hostile work environment sexual harassment also has been coined the
.conditions of work" theory of sexual harassment, MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment at 32-47 (cited
in note 1), or "absolute harassment," Merriman and Yang, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 86
& n.10 (cited in note 19).
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harassment can be perpetrated by a worker's supervisors, co-workers,
clients, or customers.8
A. Quid Pro Quo Harassment
1. Inefficient Conduct by Definition
The rules governing quid pro quo sexual harassment under
Title VII allocate loss to the employer whenever an employee engages
in certain sexual conduct-conditioning employment benefits on sub-
mission to sexual conduct.84 By definition, the employee must be a
supervisor, that is, someone with authority to hire and fire.85  An
employer is strictly liable for the conduct of the supervisor regardless
of whether the employer knew of or condoned the challenged conduct,
and regardless of whether the employer tried.to prevent the loss.8
83. "Supervisor" means "any individual having authority to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff,
recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action.' National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982).
84. See, for example, Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). This
definition of quid pro quo harassment excludes those instances in which a supervisor promises an
employee a job benefit to which the employee otherwise would not be entitled in exchange for sex.
Id. at 909. This conduct does not result in a loss to that employee. Indeed, the employee
experiences a gain. This is not to say that the conduct cannot be negative sexual conduct; another
employee might experience a loss due to the conduct.
85. See, for example, Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that
supervisors are agents with authority to make decisions regarding the employment of other
agents).
86. The United States Supreme Court in Meritor did not hold expressly that employers are
vicariously liable for quid pro quo harassment. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 72. Rather, the
Court instructed lower courts to apply general agency principles. Id. Justice Marshall, in a
concurrence joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, would hold that an employer is
vicariously liable for quid pro quo harassment by a supervisor. Id. at 77-78. Following Meritor,
lower courts have held that an employer is vicariously liable for quid pro quo harassment by a su-
pervisor. See, for example, Horn, 755 F.2d at 604-05; Highlander v. IKF.C. Nat'l Mgmt.Co., 805
F.2d 644, 648. (6th Cir. 1986); Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1983);
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982); Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d
211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979). The rule of absolute liability for employers in the quid pro quo context is
consistent with the courts' treatment of racial harassment. See Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp.,
552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977); Young v. Southwestern S. & L. Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 143-44
(5th Cir. 1975); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., 464 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1972).
See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(c) (1987) (finding that an "employer ... is responsible for its acts
and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless
of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and
regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence"). For a
critical view of employers' strict liability, see Robert F. Conte and David L. Gregory, Sexual
Harassment in Employment-Some Proposals Toward More Realistic Standards of Liability, 32
Drake L. Rev. 407 (1982-83).
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Given Congress's goal of providing compensation to persons
injured by discrimination based on sex, application of the paradigm to
quid pro quo harassment should and does minimize sexual conduct
loss relative to the cost of precaution. In the case of quid pro quo
harassment, the cost of precaution generally is much lower than the
expected cost of the injury. 87  Moreover, imposing liability on the
employer for the employee's acts without regard to the employer's
fault makes economic sense.
Recall that under the proposed paradigm, a person should be
liable for sexual conduct loss only if the average cost of precaution was
less than the average expected loss, and the plaintiff could not have
avoided the loss at an even lower cost. The type of conduct defined as
quid pro quo harassment provides a relatively easy case for loss
allocation under the paradigm. The absolute standard of care
prohibiting conduct falling within the definition of quid pro quo
harassment is, not surprisingly, relatively uncontroversial.
Consider first the standard of care for the actor, virtually al-
ways a man, in the context of quid pro quo sexual conduct. It is not
obvious that men as a group have a higher or lower cost of precaution
than the average cost over all members of society, nor is it obvious
that women as a group face a higher or lower expected loss from quid
pro quo conduct than members of society generally. It is much
clearer, however, that the difference between the cost of precaution
and the expected loss likely will be wide.
Assume that the relevant precautionary conduct is refraining
from quid pro quo sexual conduct. The supervisor's threat is a pro-
posed contract modification. The resulting contract (sex for benefit), if
the employee accepts it, would be presumptively non-optimal because
the employee would have acquiesced under duress. Courts do not
enforce contract modifications under duress because to do so would
induce people to invest in making threats and protecting against
them. Such conduct is socially wasteful in the sense that it lowers the
net social wealth. Because sexual coercion is socially costly, the aver-
age cost of refraining from sexual coercion is negative.
In contrast, the average expected loss is very high. Recall that
expected loss is the product of the probability of the loss and the
magnitude of the loss. With respect to the first factor, the average
87. This fact may explain why courts recognized quid pro quo harassment before hostile
work environment harassment, and why quid pro quo harassment is relatively less controversial
than hostile work environment harassment.
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probability that quid pro quo sexual conduct will yield a loss is one
hundred percent. Clearly, no one would view the conditioning of job
benefits on sexual favors as positive sexual conduct. Compare the
case of quid pro quo sexual conduct to one in which the supervisor
asks the employee for a date. In the latter case, the probability of loss
is no longer one hundred percent, assuming that some might view the
sexual conduct as positive (and thus non-injurious).
As to the second factor, the magnitude of the loss is large and
easy to determine. If the employee does not comply, that person will
lose the value of the employment benefit, including both its pecuniary
and non-pecuniary aspects. If the person does comply, that person
will lose the difference between the value of the employment benefit
(unconditioned on sex) and the value of the conditioned benefit. The
value of the conditioned benefit likely will be close to zero, or less than
zero, taking into consideration non-pecuniary costs associated with the
condition, such as diminished self-esteem. The potential injurer likely
knows this amount; it is the lever for his coercion.
Moreover, when the challenged conduct falls within the defini-
tion of quid pro quo sexual conduct, the plaintiff is hardly likely to
have been able to prevent the loss more cheaply than the defendant.
A female employee can take precaution against quid pro quo harass-
ment, perhaps by forgoing employment where men are her supervi-
sors. Any precaution a woman can take, however, likely will be very
costly and will greatly exceed the injurer's cost of precaution."9
2. Employer Liability
Title VII provides a remedy against the employer, but not
against the supervisor.90 Most courts have held an employer strictly
liable for the actionable sexual conduct of its supervisors.9 1 Imposing
88. Quid pro quo sexual harassment is analytically similar to an intentional tort because, in
both cases, the probability of loss is close to 100%.
89. The extremely high costs of precaution for women against quid pro quo sexual conduct
explain why "unwelcomeness' is not an element of the plaintiffs claim. See notes 129-35 and
accompanying text.
90. See note 77 and accompanying text. A tort action may be available against the
supervisor individually.
91. The Supreme Court in Meritor held that the lower court had "erred in concluding that
employers are always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors" in hostile
work environment cases. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). The
Court held that ordinary agency principles should provide the rule of decisions. Id. Since
Meritor, courts generally appear to conclude under agency principles that an employer is
vicariously liable for the hostile work environment created by a supervisor. See, for example,
Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1987); Hicks v. Gates
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liability on the employer for the quid pro quo harassment of its em-
ployees is economically justified because such a liability rule achieves
an efficient allocation of loss.
Under the paradigm, allocating loss to the supervisor is
economically justified because, between the supervisor and the victim,
the supervisor can avoid costs more cheaply. Allocating loss to the
supervisor forces him to internalize the costs of his conduct, creating a
personal incentive to invest in the optimal level of precaution.
The incentive effect of, a judgment against a supervisor,
however, is only effective to the extent that a potential judgment
would affect him. For example, if a potential injurer would be
insolvent in the face of a judgment, the expected personal cost of his
conduct is less than the expected loss to the victim. Because of this
discrepancy, the injurer would have a smaller incentive to take
precaution than he would if he were solvent at all relevant times.92
This Article refers to this inefficiency as "precaution inefficiency."
Title VII limits the plaintiff to an action against her employer,
perhaps for distributional reasons. Nonetheless, the limitation is
consistent with efficiency because it recognizes that precaution
inefficiency will occur with a rule of individual liability to the extent
such individual is or may become insolvent.
Making the employer strictly liable for the negligence of its
employees creates an incentive for employers to require the level of
care that employees responding to personal liability for their own
negligence would take (if such employees were solvent at all relevant
times). Once liable for the work-related negligence of its employees,
an employer internalizes the harm its employees cause but do not
internalize. 93 The employer now has an incentive to supervise its
employees and impose sanctions and rewards for carelessness and
carefulness, respectively. The employer will take these precautions as
long as the cost is offset by at least an equivalent reduction in the ex-
pected loss. 94
The vicarious liability of an employer for the negligence of its
employees is subject to an economically important limitation. Under
Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417-18 (10th Cir. 1987); Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc.,
845 F.2d 900, 904 (lth Cir. 1988). Contrast Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983);
Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
92. See Posner, 1 J. Legal Stud. at 42-43 (cited in note 49).
93. Id. at 43.
94. The employer's expected loss is equal to the aggregate expected loss for all employees
whose negligence is imputed to the employer, plus the expected loss from its own actions.
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the common law, an employer is strictly liable for torts committed by
an employee "within the scope of employment," but not otherwise. 95
This limitation is economically justified because it maximizes effi-
ciency. Recall that the socially optimal use of resources requires each
actor to internalize the costs of its conduct, but no more or less. The
"scope of employment" rule limits the amount of cost the employer
internalizes to that which is "caused" by the operation of the busi-
ness.96 To the extent a liability rule imposes on an employer more
costs than those the employer causes, a second type of inefficiency
results97-"production inefficiency." 98
The economic concept of causation turns on whether the exis-
tence of the employment relationship has any effect on the ex ante
probability of loss. 99 In other words, if removal of the employment
relationship between the employer and the negligent employee would
have reduced the probability of loss to zero, the employer "caused" the
loss.'°°
Alan Sykes illustrates the idea of probabilistic causation with
the following examples.101 Suppose a service station employee beats
his spouse. The service station owner does not "cause" the tort of
assault because the probability of assault would not be affected if the
employer closed the service station and fired the employee. 0 2 Con-
versely, if the tort in question is not assault, but rather negligent
repair of automobiles, the service station owner "caused" the loss
because the probability that the employee would repair automobiles
negligently would be zero if the owner closed the station and laid off
the employee. 0 3 Of course, there is a difficult, intermediate case.
95. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 228, 229 (1958).
96. For discussion of the economic significance of causation in tort law, see Steven Shavell,
An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. Legal Stud. 463
(1980); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic
Approach, 12 J. Legal Stud. 109 (1983); Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An
Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 563, 571-73 (1988). For a non-economic survey of causation in tort law, see Richard W.
Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735 (1985).
97. See Sykes, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 574 (cited in note 96); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L. J. 499, 514 (1961); Young B. Smith, Frolic &
Detour, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 444, 461 (1923).
98. The employer's business would bear more than the full costs caused by its operation. Its
profitability would be lower than if it internalized only the costs of its operation. In a competitive
market, such a business is likely to contract below the socially optimal level.
99. Sykes, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 572 (cited in note 96).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 572-73.
102. Id. at 572.
103. Id.
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Suppose, in the case of assault, that the stress of the employee's job
increased the probability that he would assault his wife. In this case,
elimination of the employment relationship would reduce the probabil-
ity of loss, but not to zero. All that can be said is that the employer
partially caused the loss.104
In the case of quid pro quo harassment, the employer, by defi-
nition, caused the loss in the economic sense. Absent the employment
relationship between the supervisor and the victim, the loss would not
have occurred. In other words, the conduct of the supervisor is within
the scope of his employment, and the loss properly is considered a cost
of the operation of the employer's business.
Moreover, the employer can take precautions that will reduce
the probability of loss. The employer, at a relatively low cost, can
implement rewards for supervisors who do not engage in quid pro quo
harassment and sanctions for those who do, taking up the slack in
incentive effect from any precaution inefficiency. Thus, imposing
vicarious liability on the employer for the quid pro quo harassment of
its supervisor corrects precaution inefficiency without creating
production inefficiency.
B. Hostile Work Environment Harassment
1. Definitional Failure in the Absence of Social Consensus
Considering the relatively easy case of quid pro quo harass-
ment foreshadows the complexity of arriving at an efficient loss alloca-
tion rule when the challenged conduct is hostile work environment
harassment. Although the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that "Title VII affords employees the right to work in an envi-
ronment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,"105
not all negative sexual conduct "affects a 'term, condition, or privilege
of employment' within the meaning of Title VII."I°6 In its most recent
opinion on the subject, the Court held that conduct rises to the level of
actionable hostile work environment sexual harassment if a reason-
able person would find the conduct hostile or abusive.107
104. Id.
105. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). See generally 45 Fed.
Reg. 74,676 (1980).
106. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. See also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991).
107. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367,370 (1993).
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The legal problem remains the same: identifying conduct that
is unreasonable. Under the paradigm, the employer should bear the
loss when such a rule would create incentives toward the optimal level
of precaution. Thus, sexual conduct should be actionable hostile work
environment sexual harassment when the defendant's cost of
precaution is lower than the expected loss, and the plaintiffs' cost of
precaution (even if lower than the expected loss) is higher than the
defendant's. Moreover, when allocating loss away from the plaintiff
produces only low potential efficiency gains, sexual conduct should be
actionable only when the potential efficiency gains outweigh the social
cost of litigation.
Courts have developed a legal standard for allocating loss from
negative sexual conduct, other than quid pro quo harassment, that
provides virtually no principled basis to determine which sexual
conduct deserves the label of hostile work environment sexual har-
assment. In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, °S the Supreme
Court sketched the contours of abusive or hostile work environment
sexual harassment under Title VII. 1°9 The Court held that sexual
conduct other than quid pro quo harassment is actionable under Title
VII provided it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to alter the victim's
working conditions and to "'create an abusive working environ-
ment."'11 Thus, sexual conduct negatively affecting a worker's em-
ployment rewards-including not only pecuniary value but also men-
tal, emotional, and physical work environment-can be actionable
under Title VII, but only if it rises to a certain level of seriousness."'
The Court addressed the question of whether and how a plain-
tiffs conduct affects allocation of loss.112 It held that even if the al-
108. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
109. Mechelle Vinson, a bank employee, testified that a vice president of the bank "fondled
her in front of other employees, followed her into the women's restroom... [and] exposed himself
to her .... " Id. at 60. She said that she agreed to have sexual intercourse with him because she
was afraid of losing her job, and that on other occasions he raped her. Id. Vinson testified that
she never reported the conduct to the vice president's supervisors or used the bank's complaint
procedure because she was afraid of him. Id. at 61. The bank vice president denied Vinson's
allegations and contended that her accusations were in response to a business dispute. Id.
Vinson testified that the alleged conduct completely stopped after 1977. Id. at 60. In September
1978, she informed the vice president that she was taking indefinite sick leave. Id. About two
months later, the bank discharged her for excessive use of sick leave. Id.
110. Id. at 66-67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
111. See, for example, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
112. The district court had held that even if the conduct had occurred, it was voluntary and
unrelated to Vinson's continued employment at the bank. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 FEP Cases (BNA)
37, 42 (D.C. 1980). The district court apparently held that Vinson was not asked to submit to
sexual demands "as a condition to obtain employment or to maintain employment or to obtain
promotions." Id. at 43. The court held that in no event could Vinson recover because she
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leged sexual conduct was "voluntary," in the sense that the defendant
did not force the plaintiff to participate in it against her will, the
challenged conduct still could be actionable under Title VII. 113 As the
Court explained, "[tihe gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is
that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome'. . . . The correct
inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the
alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual
participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary."" 4  The Court
recognized that determining whether particular sexual conduct was
"unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof and turns largely on
credibility determinations committed to the trier of fact."115
Nonetheless, its holding made it clear that the plaintiffs response to
or participation in the challenged conduct is relevant to a
determination of whether it was unwelcome.116 Ultimately, if the
plaintiff welcomed sexual conduct, she cannot recover under Title VII.
The Court's loss allocation rule in Meritor leaves much to be
desired from both a legal and an economic standpoint. No lower court
had ruled on the merits of Vinson's hostile work environment sexual
harassment claim.117 The Court held that Mechelle Vinson had
alleged facts that, if true, could constitute actionable hostile work
environment harassment and remanded the case for
reconsideration.,,, The Court's holding therefore provides no
guidance on when negative sexual conduct is "sufficiently severe or
pervasive" or when it is "unwelcome."119
The Court's recent opinion in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.120
resolved a conflict ihat had arisen among the circuits courts regarding
whether challenged sexual conduct must "seriously affect [an em-
admitted she "voluntarily" participated in a sexual relationship with the bank vice president, in
the sense that "she was not forced to participate against her will." Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
113. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
114. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)). The Court's opinion in Harris did not mention
the "unwelcomeness" requirement established in Meritor. Welcomeness was not an issue raised
by the defendant in Harris.
115. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
116. The Court held: "While 'voluntariness' in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a
claim, it does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as
a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome.
To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant." Id. at 69.
117. See id.at62.
118. Id. at 73.
119. The legal history of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination is labyrinthian,
and the Courts analysis necessarily was set in that legal context, not on a theoretical clean slate.
120. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
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ployee's] psychological well-being" by holding that it need not.121 The
Court reiterated its holding in Meritor, explaining that "[c]onduct that
is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview."122 Con-
spicuously absent from Harris is any guidance for courts struggling to
distinguish conduct that is "abusive or hostile" from that which is not.
As the following discussion illustrates, using efficiency as a guide for
allocating sexual conduct loss pierces through the rhetorical fog that
currently obscures the issues.
From an efficiency perspective, it is only worthwhile to allocate
loss through the judicial system to the extent that the costs of doing so
do not outweigh the benefits. Although the Court did not explain it
this way, its holding in Meritor sets a threshold to distinguish cases
presenting large potential efficiency gains from those that do not. The
Court held that the plaintiff must be able to allege "sufficiently severe
or pervasive" conduct to support an actionable claim.2 The standard
furthers an efficiency goal if it identifies those cases in which the
average expected loss is likely to be high, but the average cost to the
actor of precaution is likely to be low.1 24 Under these circumstances,
the possible efficiency gains likely will justify the investment of re-
sources to litigate the case.125
121. The Court cautioned, "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown." Id. at 370. The district court and the Sixth Circuit in Harris interjected the
requirement that the plaintiff show that the challenged conduct inflicted serious psychological
harm, following Sixth Circuit precedent in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th
Cir. 1986). Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
122. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370. The Court further held that the plaintiff must subjectively
perceive the conduct as abusive. Id.
123. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. See also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982).
124. The threshold requirement also is expressed by requiring the plaintiff to show that the
alleged conduct adversely affected a term or condition of her employment. In Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), a racial harassment case, the court held that challenged conduct
affects working conditions if it impacts on the pecuniary or psychological well-being of the worker.
Thus, isolated incidents of harassment or pervasive harassment that do not impair the affected
employee's emotional and psychological stability were not actionable harassment. Id. at 238. See
also Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. The EEOC guidelines appear to suggest a threshold, stating that
conduct violates Title VII when it "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1980). Some commentators contend that the guidelines
encompass as actionable harassment nonpervasive, nonsevere incidents of negative sexual
conduct. See Merriman and Yang, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 85-86 (cited in note 19).
125. Another threshold requirement is the so-called "subsequent remedial action defense."
Courts relieve an employer of liability if the employer took prompt remedial action upon learning
of the negative sexual conduct. See, for example, Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983);
Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
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Application of the paradigm to sexual conduct other than quid
pro quo harassment illustrates the difficulties in identifying a rela-
tively inexpensive and accurate standard of care. For example, sup-
pose a woman seeks a remedy for the loss she experienced when her
co-worker asked her for a date during work hours. The legal question
is whether the challenged conduct is "sufficiently severe or pervasive"
to alter the victim's working conditions and "create an abusive work
environment."116 The question under the proposed paradigm is
whether the co-worker's cost of precaution was less than the expected
loss and if so, whether the woman could have avoided the loss at an
even lower cost.
First, consider the relative complexity of determining an accu-
rate average expected loss to insert into the standard-of-care formula.
Unlike the case of quid pro quo sexual conduct that invariably causes
loss, some members of society may view the challenged conduct as
positive, rather than negative, sexual conduct. As illustrated above,
gender sometimes, but not always, indicates the average probability
and magnitude of loss appropriate for a particular individual.
Regarding the conduct at issue in this example, however, gender alone
does not indicate anything about average expected loss. In other
words, women are not, by virtue of the observable characteristic of
their gender, more vulnerable than men to this particular loss. 2 7
Because gender alone does not reliably indicate anything about
expected loss, the construct of the "reasonable woman" is virtually
useless. Individual expected loss in a given situation depends on
personal characteristics, many of which are entirely unobservable.
For example, a particular woman might be especially vulnerable to a
request for a date at the workplace because of her cultural or religious
beliefs. Note that these characteristics are not as readily observable
as gender. The cost of acquiring information about the existence of
such traits and their impact on expected loss increases the cost of
fashioning a standard of care that directs precautionary conduct to the
socially optimal level.
In addition to personal traits, case-specific circumstances can
affect the amount of expected loss from sexual conduct in a given case.
Returning to the single request for a date, the circumstances of the
request will affect whether a woman views the conduct as positive or
126. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
127. But see Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development (Harvard U., 1982).
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negative. For example, a request for a date made during a staff
meeting at which a woman worker was presiding on average likely
would be negative, rather than positive, sexual conduct, assuming
that most people would find the request a deliberate or inconsiderate
act seeking to undermine authority or credibility. 2  When the rule of
decision depends on case-specific circumstances, it is no longer truly a
rule. The cost savings that result from using average costs to inform
the rule of decision erode. Unless the potential for efficiency
enhancement is very high, the costs of making individualized decisions
likely will overwhelm efficiency gains.
The Court's threshold requirement that conduct be "sufficiently
severe and pervasive" therefore can and should be viewed as a thresh-
old for identifying those cases in which expected loss, regardless of its
precise valtie, is likely to be extremely high. In such a case, the effi-
ciency gains from the judgment likely will outweigh the cost of fash-
ioning a standard of care.
2. Women's Conduct
a. Unwelcomeness
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the emerging law of
hostile work environment sexual conduct is its focus on the conduct of
the plaintiff. Even if the defendant's conduct was "unreasonable," a
plaintiff cannot recover unless she can show that the unreasonable
conduct also was "unwelcome ." 129 The choice of words is unfortu-
nate-no person considers loss to be welcome. Nonetheless, the result
is not inconsistent with efficiency.
Under the paradigm, a woman should bear the loss from sexual
conduct if she could have prevented it more cheaply than the defen-
dant. The requirement of "unwelcomeness" viewed through the lens of
efficiency ostensibly serves the same function. Both expressly recog-
nize the capacity of women to prevent sexual conduct loss and provide
women with an incentive to achieve the optimal level of precaution
against loss.
128. The loss experienced by women from sexual conduct in the workplace is, in large part,
the negative product of their objectification. Sexual conduct directed at women workers can have
the negative effect of undermining their credibility and impairing their effectiveness vis-a-vis
their male peers. See generally Abrams, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 1204-05 (cited in note 19).
129. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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Interpreting the "unwelcomeness" requirement to achieve
economic efficiency snatches it from ambiguity and gives it a definite,
justified purpose. For example, in Meritor, the Court held that even
though the plaintiff may have participated willingly in sexual conduct,
she still could make out a hostile work environment claim as long as
she did not "welcome" the sexual conduct. The decision can be read
consistently with the paradigm. Meritor recognized that saying "no"
to negative sexual conduct is precautionary conduct, but that some-
times the costs of saying "no" exceed the benefits. Thus, although
refusing to participate in sexual conduct may have avoided some or all
of the loss, failure to refuse is not necessarily inefficient. According to
the Court, the plaintiff should bear the loss from sexual conduct if she
"welcomed" it. According to the paradigm, she should bear the loss if,
notwithstanding the defendant's suboptimal investment in precaution,
she could have avoided the loss for an even smaller investment.
The Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs speech or dress
may be evidence that she "welcomed" the conduct. Under the para-
digm, the plaintiffs speech or dress would be relevant only if: (1)
refraining from speaking or dressing as she did would have reduced
her expected loss,1 3 and (2) the cost to her of speaking or dressing a
different way is lower than the defendant's cost of precaution.
Determining "welcomeness" this way narrowly circumscribes
the circumstances in which it will bar recovery. Indeed, it is difficult
to think of an example in which the conduct is "sufficiently severe and
pervasive" (thus yielding a relatively high expected loss), and the
plaintiffs cost to avoid the loss would be lower than the defendant's.
When the expected loss is high, cases in which the average cost of
precaution for women would be lower than that for men (and both
below the expected loss) will be relatively rare. Conversely, when the
expected loss is low, the likelihood that the woman might avoid the
loss more cheaply is greater. 31
Consider a case in which the challenged conduct yields a rela-
tively high expected loss; for example, a woman alleges that her su-
pervisor sexually assaulted her.13 2 Suppose the defendant argues that
130. Changing her speech or dress are precautions only if they would have reduced her ex-
pected loss.
131. This relationship arises because precaution by the woman generally affects the probabil-
ity but not the magnitude of loss.
132. This conduct would yield a relatively high average expected loss because the average
probability and magnitude of loss are both relatively high. The average probability of loss is
relatively high because most, if not all, women would view the conduct as negative. Because it in-
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the plaintiff welcomed the challenged conduct because she wore a
"low-cut" blouse. Thus, the defendant argues that: (1) the plaintiff
could have worn a different, less revealing blouse; (2) if she had, the
probability that the defendant would have assaulted her would
decrease; 133 and (3) the plaintiffs cost of wearing a different blouse
was lower than the defendant's cost of refraining from the conduct.
The difficult determination of fact, as the Court described it, is
not so difficult once broken into its component parts. The truth of
premise (2) depends on a view of human conduct that many reason-
able people find inaccurate, if not outrageous-that women's clothing
causes men to assault women.' 34 Even giving full credit to the social
stereotype, a woman's choice of blouse at most partially "causes" as-
sault. Assuming it would reduce the probability of loss at all, wearing
a different blouse certainly would not reduce the probability of loss to
zero.1 35 Thus, at best, the reduction in expected loss would be rela-
tively small.
Even momentarily accepting the second premise to be true, the
third premise is not necessarily true. Freedom to dress as one pleases
is valuable; giving it up is costly. The cost to the plaintiff of dressing
"differently," whatever that might mean, intuitively outweighs the
cost to the defendant of more carefully determining the willingness of
his sexual targets.
b. Assumption of the Risk
Now suppose the woman alleges that vulgar language and
photographs of nude women in the workplace created a sexually hos-
tile work environment. Further suppose that the defendant claims
the woman knew about the language and photographs when she took
the job. Again the plaintiffs conduct is at issue. In essence, the de-
fendant claims that the woman "assumed the risk" of her loss136 by
volves a potential affxont to privacy and physical security, the average magnitude of loss also
would be relatively high.
133. Wearing a different blouse would in no event affect the magnitude of the loss. Wearing
a different blouse could reduce the expected loss only if it reduced the probability of loss.
134. See the discussion in notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
135. For a discussion of the economic concept of probabilistic causation, see the discussion in
notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
136. Before workers' compensation schemes, the assumption-of-the-risk defense barred an
employee from recovering for a workplace injury when the injury was the result of hazards she
knew about. See Posner, 1 J. Legal Stud. at 45 (cited in note 49). Moreover, the plaintiff was
barred even if the cost of precaution was less than the reduction in expected loss, that is, if the
employer was negligent.
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agreeing ex ante to accept the risk of this particular sexual conduct
loss in exchange for her wages. Once the loss she agreed to accept has
occurred, the law should not compensate her for it again.
These very circumstances faced the Sixth Circuit in the now-
infamous case Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.137 The plaintiff, a sala-
ried administrative assistant for an oil refining company, 138 alleged
that a co-worker made vulgar remarks about women and occasionally
directed those comments to her. She also alleged that the co-worker
and other male workers displayed magazine pictures of partially nude
women in offices and work areas.139 The circuit court, applying what it
termed a "reasonable person" test, concluded that a reasonable person
would not have suffered a serious loss because of the challenged con-
duct.' 40 The court held that the co-worker's "obscenities" were "not so
startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff or
other female employees."' 4' The sexually oriented posters "had a de
minimis effect on the plaintiffs work environment when considered in
the context of a society that condones and publicly features and com-
mercially exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica .... 42
Thus, the challenged conduct did not "unreasonably interfer[e] with
the plaintiffs work performance and creat[e] an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive working environment .... ,,3
137. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
138. Rabidue began her employment as an hourly executive secretary and later was
promoted to the position of administrative assistant. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 614. With the promo-
tion, she became responsible for numerous additional duties, including direct contact with
customers of the firm. Id. at 614-15. Later, Rabidue took on the responsibilities of office and
credit manager. Id. at 615. In this capacity she had the authority to assign work to other
employees. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 622. Rabidue was the Sixth Circuit's first hostile work environment case. It
articulated a legal standard under which an employee, to prevail in a hostile work environment
case, had to show:
(1) the employee was a member of a protected class;
(2) the employee was subjected to unwelcomed sexual harassment in the form of
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature;
(3) the harassment complained of was based upon sex;
(4) the charged sexual harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with
the plaintiffs work performance and creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment that affected seriously the psycho logical [sic] well-being of the
plaintiff, and
(5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.
Id. at 619-20 (citations omited).
141. Id. at 622.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 619. The court apparently determined the average expected loss from the
challenged conduct based on a group that undervalued or excluded the expected loss to women. It
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The majority determined that a "reasonable person" would not
have been affected significantly by the challenged conduct, based on
its evaluation of "the totality of the physical environment of the plain-
tiffs work area" with reference to the norms of conduct before and
after the plaintiff began working there. 144 In essence, the court held
that the plaintiffs act of agreeing to work for the defendant provided
evidence that she "welcomed" the negative sexual conduct and the
consequent personal loss.
The idea that workers assume various levels of risk in return
for incremental wage increases is nothing new.145 However, the idea
that women accept the risk of negative sexual conduct in return for a
compensating wage differential is quite controversial. A worker will
demand more compensation to work at a job she believes involves a
higher expected loss from injury.'4 Because attitudes and suscepti-
bilities to loss vary, the risk premium necessary to attract workers to
a particular job will vary according to the worker. A firm will offer the
lowest risk premium necessary to attract the workers it needs to fill
its jobs. 47 Alternatively, the firm can reduce its wage costs by lower-
ing the risk of loss to workers on the job."4
For example, suppose a particular job involves an expected loss
from injury of twenty dollars. If the employer installs a particular
safety device that costs ten dollars, it can reduce the expected loss by
is not clear whether the Sixth Circuit's "reasonable person's" expected loss represented an
average expected loss over all people (men and women) or only men. On a continuum from the
highest to lowest expected cost, an all.women group would yield the highest expected cost, an all-
people group would be intermediate, and an all-men group would yield the lowest expected cost,
assuming that women generally view the challenged conduct negatively, whereas men generally
do not. Judge Keith, in dissent, rejected the majority's use of a "reasonable person" to measure
expected loss because it "fails to account for the wide divergence between most women's view of
appropriate sexual conduct and those of men." Id. at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). He argued, in
essence, that had the majority determined the average expected loss over all people, including
women, it would have found the average expected loss to be higher than that determined over all
men and excluding women. See id. Determining the average expected loss over all women,
excluding men, would have yielded a still higher figure.
144. Id. at 620, 622.
145. See generally Viscusi, Risk by Choice (cited in note 48). For an early discussion, see
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations 99, 100 (Random House, 1937) (claiming that "[t]he wages of
labour vary with the ease or hardship . . . the honourableness or dishonourableness of the
employment").
146. The additional compensation is not always cash, but may take the form of larger fringe
benefits, shorter hours, or enhanced prestige.
147. Workers willing to accept the most risk for the lowest premium will accept the jobs.
Other workers who require a larger premium to assume risk will choose other, less risky jobs.
See Viscusi, Risk by Choice at 39 (cited in note 48).
148. In the case of physical injury to workers, the firm can install safety devices that will
prevent the loss. A wealth-maximizing firm will invest in precaution until the reduction in wage
costs no longer exceeds the cost of the precautions. Id.
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fifteen dollars. Now assume that workers agree to accept a salary of
five hundred dollars when the safety device is installed. Inducing a
risk-neutral worker to take the job without the safety device would
require a fifteen dollar risk premium, enough to compensate her for
the increased expected loss. The firm would choose to install the
safety device for ten dollars rather than pay fifteen dollars to attract
the worker to the riskier job. The firm would not install the safety
device, however, if it could hire workers willing to accept the risk for a
premium of less than ten dollars, the cost of installing the safety
device.
The notion of assumption of the risk as a bar to recovery en-
ables a person who prefers risk to market that preference. Some
workers, willing to tolerate greater risk, may agree to work for a wage
that would not be acceptable to a risk-averse or risk-neutral person.
By barring recovery to the worker who accepted a premium for the
risky job, the court enforces a socially optimal allocation of loss be-
tween an employer and an employee under which a risk-preferring
employee agrees to accept risk in exchange for a risk differential. If
the employer knew ex ante it could not enforce the agreement with a
risk-preferring employee, it would invest in safety and pay the worker
less. Without the doctrine of assumption of the risk, or any other way
of enforcing the ex ante allocation of risk, the employer would be worse
off, but the employee would not be better off.149
The idea that workers trade risk for wages depends on an
underlying assumption that workers have full information about risks
and that the transaction costs between the worker and the employer
are low.'5 When these conditions are satisfied, the worker's act of
accepting the job provides reliable evidence that she willingly accepted
risk for a wage differential. These assumptions are not always valid
outside the world of theory, but they may not always be invalid,
either.15
149. This example is adapted from Posner, 1 J. Legal Stud. at 45 (cited in note 49).
150. See generally Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (Oxford
U., 2d ed. 1958).
151. Competition among employers for female workers may produce information regarding
the level of sexual conduct at a particular workplace. Employers competing with each other for
labor, or for the ability to pay lower pecuniary wages to the employees they have, might volunteer
knowledge of their rivals' sexually offensive workplaces. Even if employees do not obtain ex ante
information about the level of sexual conduct at a particular workplace, employers who tolerate
harassment will be sued more frequently than employers who successfully prevent sexual conduct
loss. The harassing employers will drop out of competition over time in favor of non-harassing
employers.
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In Rabidue, the plaintiff probably did not accept the risk of loss
from the alleged sexual conduct in exchange for a compensating wage
differential. 152 Judge Keith, in his dissent, arrived at this conclusion
not because of the presence of high transaction costs or informational
asymmetry, but based on common sense. He rejected the idea that
the "prevailing work environment" before the plaintiff began working
establishes the loss a female worker has agreed to endure by accept-
ing the position.1  The judge did recognize that in some cases, a
woman can, by agreeing to accept wages for a particular job, assume
the risk of certain sexual conduct loss.," According to Judge Keith, a
woman assumes the risk of sexual conduct loss only when enduring
the challenged conduct is part of her job description. 155  He wrote:
"[Tihe only additional question I would find relevant is whether the
behavior complained of is required to perform the work."1
Judge Keith's limitation of the assumption-of-the-risk defense
to those risks that are an explicit part of the employee's job descrip-
tion makes economic sense on the theory that an employee is better
able to assess the risk of loss when the risk is part of the job descrip-
tion. If a prospective employee lacks information ex ante about the
probability and magnitude of loss from non-job related sexual conduct,
her willingness to take the job is not a reliable indication that she
agreed to assume such loss. 157 Without reliable indication that the
parties have reached a privately optimal allocation of risk, there is no
efficiency justification for barring the plaintiff from recovery based on
assumption of the risk.
152. Nothing about Rabidue's job as an administrative assistant required that she be exposed
to sexual conduct loss, other than the fact that her job involved working in close proximity with
potential injurers, namely, men. Moreover, Rabidue almost certainly did not receive more
compensation than her male counterparts to compensate her for the additional risk of sexual
conduct loss she arguably assumed.
153. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. Judge Keith further stated:
For example, depending on their job descriptions, employees of soft pornography
publishers or other sex-related industries should reasonably expect exposure to nudity,
sexually explicit language or even simulated sex as inherent aspects of working in that
field. However, when that exposure goes beyond what is required professionally, even sex
industry employees are protected under [Title VII] from non-job related sexual demands,
language or other offensive behavior by supervisors or co-workers.
Id.
157. Kip Viscusi notes that an employee usually can gain information about job risks once on
the job and can quit if the agreed wage is insufficient, taking into consideration the actual
expected loss. Viscusi, Risk by Choice at 66-69 (cited in note 48). The so-called quit response
raises a number of efficiency considerations beyond the scope of this Article.
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Women can and do market their preference for risky sexual
conduct, however. Some women, whose tastes vary from Catharine
MacKinnon's, agree to work as "Laker Girls," models for the swimsuit
edition, or cocktail servers in skimpy attire. Wholesale elimination of
the assumption-of-the-risk defense for employers charged with hostile
work environment harassment deprives women of the opportunity to
market their risk preference, but it does not make them better off.
This prohibition may appeal to feminists who reject the idea that a
woman freely could agree to accept the risk of negative sexual conduct
in exchange for money or other benefits, but there is no evidence that
the increase in value to feminists would offset the decrease in value to
risk-preferring women.
2. Employer Liability
In the case of hostile work environment harassment, the em-
ployment relationship does not fully cause the loss in the sense that it
does when the challenged conduct is quid pro quo harassment. For
example, suppose a female worker alleges that her co-workers tell
sexual jokes and use vulgar language in her presence. Hypothetically
removing the employment relationship between the offensive co-
workers and the employer would not reduce the probability of loss to
zero. Thus, according to the economic concept of probabilistic
causation, the employer did not fully cause the loss. Imposing liability
on the employer without regard to notice or fault would result in
production inefficiency.'58
In hostile work environment cases in which the injurer is not a
supervisor, the employer generally is liable only if the employer knew
or should have known of the challenged conduct. 59 Requiring the
plaintiff to show that the employer knew or should have known about
the negligent conduct of its employees in a hostile work environment
case reduces the likelihood that the employer will be forced to inter-
nalize loss it did not "cause," thus reducing production inefficiency. 160
158. Nonetheless, numerous commentators urge strict liability for the employer for all in-
stances of workplace 'harassment" on the unsupported ground that the employer is "the party
most able to control the work environment." See, for example, Merriman and Yang, 13 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 102 (cited in note 19).
159. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Higgins v. Gates
Rubber Co., 578 F.2d 281,283 (10th Cir. 1978).
160. The plaintiff can establish that her employer knew or should have known of the
harassment directly, by showing that she complained to her supervisors, or indirectly, by showing
that the conduct was so pervasive that a reasonable employer would have known. Katz v. Dole,
709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
1994] 469
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The rule also creates an important incentive for employees to
report risky situations to employers. When the employment relation-
ship between the injurer and the employer does not fully cause the
loss, a potential plaintiff may be able to detect risky situations more
cheaply than the employer. 16 The rule thus provides an important
incentive for prospective plaintiffs to bring risky situations to the
attention of their employers.162 This incentive is lacking if the poten-
tial plaintiffs supervisor is creating the risky situation. Some courts
therefore find vicarious liability regardless of notice to the employer in
hostile work environment cases in which a supervisor has engaged in
the challenged conduct. 163  Moreover, when the supervisor is the in-
jurer, the case begins to look more like quid pro quo harassment,
regardless of the absence of express conditioning of employment bene-
fits. Under these conditions, the effect of the employment relationship
between the injurer and the employer on the probability of loss is
likely to be greater than in situations in which the injurer is a co-
worker or subordinate.
IV. RESPONSE TO THE CRITICS
The criticisms of the emerging law of sexual harassment are
varied, but share the theme that the standard does not do enough to
compensate women.16 4 Unlike most loss allocated by tort law, sexual
conduct loss lends itself to political manipulation by private interest
groups. The probability of suffering sexual conduct loss is higher
161. Catharine MacKinnon and others have observed that victims of sexual harassment do
not report the offensive conduct or otherwise complain because they are embarrassed, intimi-
dated, and demeaned by the conduct. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment at 27 (cited in note 1); Jill
Laurie Goodman, Sexual Harassment: - Some Observations on the Distance Travelled and the
Distance Yet to Go, 10 Cap. U. L. Rev. 445, 454-58 & nn.60-82 (1981); Merriman and Yang, 13
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 99 (cited in note 19). The presence of reactions in a given case
raise the cost of reporting but do not support a general conclusion that plaintiffs' costs are always
greater than defendants'.
162. Under the common law, this rule limiting an employer's liability was known as the
"fellow servant rule." William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 528-30 (West, 1971);
Posner, 1 J. Legal Stud. at 44 (cited in note 49).
163. See, for example, Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979). See also
Joan Vermeulen, Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Harassment by Supervisory
Employers, 10 Cap. U. L. Rev. 499, 508 (1981).
164. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women,
106 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1993) (proposing legal remedies for women harassed on public streets);
Merriman and Yang, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 87 (cited in note 19) (arguing that "the
level of proof required by the courts in co-worker sexual harassment cases is unreasonably high.
Second, the relief permitted these plaintiffs under [Title VI] is inadequate.").
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among working women than among other participants in society,
creating a natural, identifiable interest group. In essence, but not in
form, activists claiming to represent this group have argued, through
feminist scholarship and other fora, for a loss allocation rule that
redistributes wealth from employers to female workers.165
Commentators call for an unspecified reworking of loss alloca-
tion that evaluates behavior "through a global lens which encom-
passes gender hierarchy as part of the totality of the circumstances." 6
They discuss the relative merits of "equality" and "privacy" as legal
strategies for achieving "justice" for women. 167 Underlying the debate
is the fundamental, and fundamentally political, assertion that femi-
nists speak for all women and that all women want what feminists
want.18 8 Because justice so conceived is axiomatic, it is hopelessly
elusive as a public policy goal. Nonetheless, under the cloak of femi-
nism, activists pass judgment on policy based only on its conformity to
an undefined and undefinable concept of justice. 69 Thus, evaluation of
policy becomes axiomatic-a result is good because it is just. Because
only the players know the rules, only the players know the winner.
This "closed game" is frustrating because it condemns inconsistent
views without reason or argument against them. Worse, because it
stands on emotion and instinct, it cannot tolerate challenge based on
reason.
70
165. See generally MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (cited in note 1). See
also Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 761 (1990) (arguing that
Macfinnon's rejection of liberal notions of autonomy can alienate women who desire to exercise
individual choice in the conduct of their lives); Martha A. Minow, Making All the Difference:
Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law 146-56 (Cornell U., 1990) (claiming that the neutrality of
the state toward outcomes that underlies liberal legal thought is not truly neutral, but rather
advantages those already privileged and marginalizes the disadvantaged).
166. Pollack, 13 Harv. Women's L. J. at 61 (cited in note 2).
167. Stein, 77 Minn. L. Rev. at 1153-55 (cited in note 6).
168. Pollack characterizes the modern women's movement as a leap from the "consciousness-
raising" that establishes a connection among individual women to a political connection among all
women. See Pollack, 13 Harv. Women's L. J. at 40 (cited in note 2).
169. See, for example, Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1461, 1476 (1986) (concluding that
"[c]onsequently, traditional tort theories continue to produce unsatisfying results when courts at.
tempt to find grounds on which to grant relief").
170. John Stuart Mill observed this immutable resistance to reason in connection with men's
attitudes toward the civil rights of women. He wrote:
So long as an opinion is strongly rooted in feelings, it gains rather than loses in
stability by having a preponderating weight of argument against it. For if it were ac-
cepted as a result of the argument, the refutation of the argument might shake the solid-
ity of the conviction; but when it rests solely on feeling, the worse it fares in argumenta-
tive contest, the more persuaded its adherents are that their feeling must have some
deeper ground, which the arguments do not reach; and while the feeling remains, it is al-
ways throwing up fresh entrenchments of argument to repair any breach made in the old.
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For example, Margaret Jane Radin rejects the application of
efficiency analysis in the context of interpersonal relations. 71  She
contends that even thinking about human, and in particular sexual,
relationships in economic terms is "inferior"17 2 because "market dis-
course itself might be antagonistic to interests of personhood."'
73
Valuing bodily integrity "implicitly conceives of as fungible something
that we know to be personal, in fact conceives of as fungible property
something we know to be too personal even to be personal property."1
74
Radin's criticism reveals a pervasive normative objection to
economic analysis as a policy-making tool. Economic analysis requires
a fundamental assumption about the ability of individuals to make
personally wealth-maximizing decisions. 175 It is not oblivious to social
externalities, both negative and positive, arising from the exercise of
individual, self-interested choice. Unlike feminist thinking, however,
economic analysis does not necessarily eradicate individual choice in
favor of group norms.
For example, a group's outrage when a person values her dig-
nity less than the group's norm is itself a cost to be taken into account,
or internalized, in allocating loss. Of course, another group's
satisfaction is a benefit that similarly must be included in the
reckoning. What offends Radin is that economic analysis assumes
that an individual can value her dignity differently than the group
norm, and that negative social externalities might not overwhelm her
individual choice. 176
John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women in Three Essays 427 (D. Appleton, 3d ed. 1975).
171. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987). Radin
considers the phenomenon of "market-inalienability," which she defines as the condition under
which things may be given away but not sold, such as sex, babies, or reproductive capacity. Id. at
1850.
172. Id. at 1885-86. In reaction to Posner's analytical focus on the cost of rape to the victim
and the benefit to the rapist, Radin states: "Only an inferior conception of human flourishing
would regard rape as benefiting the rapist." Id. at 1884. She argues that the concept of human
flourishing underlying market analysis is distinct from and inferior to one that "we can accept as
properly ours." Id.
173. Id. at 1879. But see Richard Posner, Sex and Reason 118 (Harvard U., 1992) (claiming
that "love can be given a precise economic meaning ... it is a preoccupation with the unique
particulars of another person, particulars for which there is, by definition, no substitute to be
found in any other person.... Rational choice and economic decision making are not synonyms
for commercial exchange.").
174. Radin, 100 Harv. L. Rev. at 1880 (cited in note 171).
175. See note 23 and accompanying text.
176. Radin would view sexual harassment law not as a loss allocation rule but rather as an
effort "to take into account workers'. . . personhood." Radin, 100 Harv. L. Rev. at 1920 (cited in
note 171).
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Thus, feminists advocate sexual harassment law that defines
"reasonable" not by way of social consensus, but rather by fiat. The
reasonable woman is who they say she is, without regard to the indi-
vidual women who do not think, feel, or behave as she does.l17 More-
over, feminists utterly disregard the social cost of policy that would
accommodate infmite sensitivities.
Perhaps because it is inconsistent with their construct of the
"reasonable woman," feminists either reject or simply have not consid-
ered the fact that women can, and in certain circumstances should,
protect themselves from sexual conduct loss. This contrived
helplessness forces women into the role of victim, but also relieves
them of responsibility.17 8
The Court's "unwelcomeness" requirement has incited a
hailstorm of criticism from feminist scholars who believe that it is an
"ostensibly neutral rule of evaluation to discredit women."'1 9 Wendy
Pollack apparently contends that no inquiry into the plaintiffs
participation in or response to the challenged conduct is appropriate.'18
She sarcastically criticizes the inquiry into whether the plaintiff
welcomed the challenged conduct as an evaluation of "a woman's
success in controlling the 'animal nature' of men, from which women
must protect themselves." s1
Pollack's criticism is valid in part, but goes too far. An evalu-
ation of the plaintiffs speech and dress to determine whether it pro-
voked, and thereby excused, a sexual attack perpetuates the dual
myths that women are seductive sexual objects, and that when suffi-
177. For example, Wendy Pollack begins her article on sexual harassment with a first-person
account of her experience as a union carpenter from 1978 through 1986. Pollack, 13 Harv.
Women's L. J. at 36-38 (cited in note 2). She observes without citation to authority a "trend
nationwide of women with several years of experience entering the trades, often for lower.paying
jobs." Id. at 37. She concludes that all women reflected in this so-called "trend" left the trades
fundamentally for the same reason she did--"the refusal and inability to tolerate the hostile work
environment." Id. at 38. No doubt the ranks of union carpenters, especially in the late seventies
and early eighties, were inhospitable to women, but Pollack's broad conclusion about the experi-
ence and motivation of women generally goes well beyond her capacity to observe. But see Cahn,
77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1402 (cited in note 8); Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems
of Exclusion in Feminis& Thought (Beacon, 1988).
178. Susan Wendell, Oppression and Victimization: Choice and Responsibility, in Debra
Shogun, ed., A Reader in Feminist Ethics 277, 287 (Can. Scholars', 1992).
179. Pollack, 13 Harv. Women's L. J. at 56 (cited in note 2).
180. Pollack writes, "If Vinson's speech or dress was inappropriate for the work environ-
ment, she should have been told, not raped." Id. Inscrutably, however, Pollack acknowledges
"putting an arm around a woman's shoulder may be considered a friendly gesture or an offensive
and threatening one. depending upon the woman's view of the initiator, his intentions, and the
situation." Id.
181. Id. at 56-57 (citing Jane Aiken, Differentiating Sex from Sex The Male Irresistible
Impulse, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 357 (1983-84)).
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ciently provoked, men lose control of themselves and cannot be held
accountable for their actions. 18 2 These myths about human sexuality
are rooted deeply in our society and our law. 1' But totally eliminating
the woman's participation in the challenged conduct from the calculus
is equally, if not more, degrading to women. It invokes yet another
stereotype-that women are incapable of taking steps to protect
themselves from sexual loss and, therefore, must be excused from any
failure to do so.'"
This construct of the context in which sexual conduct loss oc-
curs replaces the human plaintiff with a monolithic suffering woman
who endures her environment but does not interact with it. Because
this woman has no capacity to protect herself from loss, she becomes a
pain sponge, at the mercy of some exogenous protector. 1 5 This stereo-
type invokes the stifling paternalism that excluded women from
"dangerous, unwholesome" working conditions in the early twentieth
century. 1M  It is at work today, fueling both overt and covert barriers
to the entry and advancement of women in the workplace.
Armed with this type of reasoning, feminists oppose the notion
that a woman can voluntarily and in her right mind assume, in
exchange for wages, the risk of what they deem negative sexual
182. See Aiken, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 365-67 (cited in note 181).
183. See, for example, Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that "Mr. Price's conduct appears to be
nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity, or mannerism. By his alleged sexual
advances, Mr. Price was satisfying a personal urge."); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977);
Warshafsky v. The Journal Co., 63 Wis. 2d 130, 216 N.W.2d 197 (1974). See also Phyllis Schlafly's
testimony before the Senate Labor Committee reprinted in part in the New York Times: "when a
woman walks across the room .... she speaks with a universal body language that most men
intuitively understand. Men hardly ever ask sexual favors of women from whom the certain
answer is 'No'. Virtuous women are seldom accosted by unwelcome sexual propositions or
familiarities, obscene talk, or profane language." Aide Calls Sexual Harassment "Tip of the
Iceberg" N.Y. Times C8 (Apr. 22, 1981)._
184. For a rare criticism of feminist polemics on rape, especially acquaintance rape, see Katie
Roiphe, Date Rape's Other Victim, N.Y. Times Mag. 26 (June 13, 1993). Roiphe observed an
unflattering parallel between women depicted as victims of sexual harassment and rape and "that
50's ideal my mother and other women of her generation fought so hard to leave behind." Id. She
wrote:
They didn't like her passivity, her wide-eyed innocence. They didn't like the fact
that she was perpetually offended by sexual innuendo. They didn't like her excessive
need for protection. She represented personal, social and intellectual possibilities col-
lapsed, and they worked and marched, shouted and wrote to make her irrelevant for their
daughters. But here she is again, with her pure intentions and her wide eyes. Only this
time it is the feminists themselves who are breathing new life into her.
Id.
185. See Cahn, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1416 (cited in note 8) (criticizing the "reasonable
woman" standard as reinforcing an image of women as victims who need protection).
186. See, for example, Muller u. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (limiting hours women could
work).
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conduct. This view reinforces another degrading and debilitating
stereotype, that women cannot be accountable ex post for decisions
they make ex ante regarding their own conduct. 18 7 Because she is a
woman, the argument goes, words or conduct that communicated her
acquiescence before or at the time of the challenged conduct should be
voidable at her option.'m
Although even the most radical feminist would dispute that a
woman is incapable of entering into a binding contract on grounds of
incapacity, the same feminist would contend that as to sex, the rules
should be different. As to sexual conduct, at work or anywhere else,
the very act is so inherently coercive, so fraught with domination and
submission, that consent to it by a woman is impossible. 18 9
This invocation of coercion to eliminate the effectiveness of a
woman's objective consent is no more than an escape hatch from the
"problem" of the woman with a mind of her own. Like it or not,
women attach value to their own sexual attractiveness to men. Using
sexual harassment as a legal tool to close the market for sexual at-
tractiveness is likely to be as effective as the Eighteenth Amendment
was at eliminating the consumption of alcohol.
The criticisms of various scholars eschewing the "reasonable
woman," or embracing a particular embodiment of her, are really
observations about line drawing. They are comments on the accuracy
and value of the search for the average costs of precaution and aver-
age expected loss. Our society simply has yet to reach a complete
consensus on sexual conduct in the workplace. Under the proposed
paradigm, the search for consensus would proceed with honest consid-
eration of the attitudes and tastes of individual men and women,
excluding or emphasizing none.
187. See generally Roiphe, N.Y. Times Mag. at 26 (cited in note 184).
188. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Room for Manoeuver Toward a Theory of Practice in Critical
Legal Studies, 14 Law & Soc.,Inq. 69, 80 (1989) (arguing that a woman's belief as to whether she
has consented to intercourse is an unreliable indicator of consent because her beliefs are 'invaded
by social power and dominant notions"); MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State at
177 (cited in note 1) (claiming that "[w]omen are socialized to passive receptivity"); Dworkin,
Intercourse (cited in note 20) (claiming that sexual intercourse is by nature coercive and
perpetuates the subordination of women).
189. See note 188 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Congress's mandate in Title VII left to the courts the task of
devising a loss allocation rule that bridges the perception gap between
men and women regarding appropriate sexual conduct at the work-
place. On the subject of sexual conduct, individual attitudes and
tastes vary widely. The shape the law takes will affect conditions in
every workplace and the life of every citizen. Thus, the search for
social consensus on what conduct is "reasonable" is and will no doubt
continue to be controversial.
The paradigm proposed in this Article directs courts to allocate
sexual conduct loss with the goal of maximizing social wealth. Using
economic efficiency to infuse meaning into the emerging law honestly
recognizes that both men and women can take action to reduce loss
from sexual conduct at the workplace. Moreover, it recognizes that
reducing such loss is costly. Because our resources are scarce, the best
we can hope for is a sexual harassment policy that encourages
investment in precaution against sexual harassment to the extent the
results are worth the cost.
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